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Abstract
We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear
utilities. For linear pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First
Welfare Theorem states that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures
efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many real-world markets – especially
for water – use convex pricing instead, often known as increasing block tariffs (IBTs). IBTs are thought
to promote equality, but there is a dearth of theoretical support for this claim.
In this paper, we study a simple convex pricing rule and show that the resulting equilibria are
guaranteed to maximize a CES welfare function. Furthermore, a parameter of the pricing rule directly
determines which CES welfare function is implemented; by tweaking this parameter, the social planner
can precisely control the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. Our result holds for any valuations
that are homogeneous, differentiable, and concave. We also give an iterative algorithm for computing
these pricing rules, derive a truthful mechanism for the case of a single good, and discuss Sybil attacks.
1 Introduction
Markets are one of the oldest mechanisms for distributing resources; indeed, commodity prices were metic-
ulously recorded in ancient Babylon for over 300 years [42, 43]. In a market, buyers and sellers exchange
goods according to some sort of pricing system, and Walrasian equilibrium1 occurs when the demand of the
buyers exactly equals the supply of the sellers. This concept was first studied by Walras in the 1870’s [47].
In 1954, Arrow and Debreu showed that under some conditions, a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed to
exist [1]. Most of the literature on Walrasian equilibrium only considers linear pricing, meaning the cost of
a good is proportional to the quantity purchased.
In this paper, we consider the problem of allocating divisible goods to competing agents via a market
mechanism. We assume each agent has quasilinear utility: an agent’s utility is her value for the resources
she obtains (her valuation), minus the money she spends (her payment). The First Welfare Theorem states
that in this setting, the linear-pricing Walrasian equilibria are exactly the allocations maximizing utilitarian
welfare, i.e., the sum of agent valuations. Thus linear pricing implements utilitarian welfare in Walrasian
equilibrium (sometimes abbreviated “WE”).
The result is powerful, but also limiting. Maximizing utilitarian welfare yields the most efficient outcome,
but may also cause maximal inequality (see Figure 1).
One common alternative is convex pricing. In this paper, we study convex pricing rules p of the form
p(xi) =
(∑
j
qjxij
)1/ρ
where xi is bundle agent i receives, xij ∈ R≥0 is the fraction of good j she receives, q1, . . . , qm are constants,
and ρ ∈ (0, 1] determines the curvature of the pricing rule. Like linear pricing, p is still anonymous, meaning
that agents’ payments depend only on their purchases (and not on their preferences, for example).
When ρ = 1, p reduces to linear pricing. When ρ < 1, p is strictly convex, meaning that doubling one’s
consumption will more than double the price. This will make it easy to buy a small amount, but hard to buy
1This is also known as market equilibrium, competitive equilibrium, and general equilibrium, depending on the context.
1
w1 = 1 w2 = 6 w3 = 5
price = 6
w1 = 1 w2 = 6 w3 = 5
Figure 1: An example of how linear pricing can lead to maximal inequality. Consider the three agents above
and a single good (say, water), where each agent i’s value for x units of the good is wi · x. The unique
linear-pricing Walrasian equilibrium sets a price of 6 per unit, which results in agent 2 buying all of the good
and the other two agents receiving nothing. More generally, the equilibrium price reflects the maximum
anyone is willing to pay, and anyone who is not willing to pay that much is priced out of the market and
receives nothing. In contrast, our nonlinear pricing rule always ensures that everyone receives a nonzero
amount; see Section 2.
a large amount, which intuitively should lead to a more equal distribution of resources. As the curvature of
the pricing rule grows, this effect should be amplified, leading to a different equality/efficiency tradeoff.
Our work seeks to formalize that claim. We will show that the Walrasian equilibria of these convex
pricing rules are guaranteed to maximize a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare function, where
the choice of ρ determines the specific welfare function and thus the precise equality/efficiency tradeoff
(Theorem 4.1). Our result holds for a wide range of agent valuations.
Convex pricing in the real world. Convex pricing is especially pervasive in the water sector, where
such pricing rules are known as increasing block tariffs (IBTs) [48], typically implemented with discrete
blocks of water (hence the name). IBTs have been implemented and empirically studied in Israel [4], South
Africa [10], Spain [20], Jordan [25], and the United States [37], among many other countries.
IBTs are often claimed to promote equality in water access [48], but there has been limited theoretical
evidence supporting this (see [28] for one of the only examples). On the other hand, a common concern is
that IBTs may lead to poor “economic efficiency” [7, 28]. Our work shows that at least on a theoretical
level, convexity of pricing does not necessarily lead to inefficiency: it simply maximizes a different welfare
function than the traditional utilitarian one. In particular, it maximizes a CES welfare function.
The Second Welfare Theorem and personalized pricing. The Second Welfare Theorem is perhaps
the most famous theoretical result regarding implementation in Walrasian equilibrium. It states any Pareto
optimum can be a WE when an arbitrary redistribution of initial wealth is allowed.2 Another method that
achieves the same goal is personalized pricing, where different agents can be charged different (linear) prices.
In contrast, convex pricing is anonymous: agents purchasing the same bundle always pay the same price.
Each of these approaches certainly has its own pros and cons. In this paper, our goal is not to claim
that convex pricing is “better” than other approaches (or vice versa). Regardless of which is “better” in any
given situation, convex pricing is widely used in practice, and is often claimed to promote equality. Our goal
in this paper is to formally quantify that claim.
1.1 CES welfare functions
A welfare function [5, 39] assigns a real number to each possible outcome, with higher numbers (i.e, higher
welfare) indicating outcomes that are more desirable to the social planner. Different welfare functions
represent different priorities; our focus will be the tradeoff between overall efficiency and individual equality.
For a fixed constant ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) welfare of outcome x
2Specifically, for any Pareto optimal allocation, there exists a redistribution of initial wealth which makes that allocation a
WE. However, our quasilinear utility model does not have a concept of initial wealth (alternatively, initial wealth is simply an
additive constant in agents’ utilities which does not affect their behavior), so this result is not as mathematically relevant. See
Section 2.1 for additional discussion.
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is
Φ(ρ,x) =
( ∑
agents i
vi(x)
ρ
)1/ρ
where vi(x) is agent i’s value for x. In general, different values of ρ will lead to different optimal allocations,
so whenever we say “maximum CES welfare allocation”, we mean with respect to a fixed value of ρ. See
Section 3 for an axiomatic characterization of CES welfare functions.
For ρ = 1, this is utilitarian welfare, i.e., the sum of valuations. The limit as ρ → −∞ yields max-
min welfare (the minimum valuation) [36, 41, 40], whereas ρ → 0 yields Nash welfare (the product of
valuations) [22, 30]. The closer ρ gets to −∞, the more the social planner cares about individual equality
(max-min welfare being the extreme case of this), and the closer ρ gets to 1, the more the social planner
cares about overall societal good (utilitarian welfare being the extreme case of this). For this reason, ρ
is called the inequality aversion parameter, and this family of welfare functions is thought to exhibit an
equality/efficiency tradeoff.
These welfare functions were originally proposed by Atkinson [3]; indeed, his motivation was to measure
the level of inequality in a society. Despite being extremely influential in the traditional economics literature
(see [11] for a survey), the CES welfare function has received almost no attention in the computational
economics community.3
Finally, note that Φ(ρ,x) is defined with respect to the each agent’s valuation vi and not her overall
quasilinear utility ui. We acknowledge that it is standard to define welfare with respect to the overall utility
ui, and we have two reasons for not doing so. First, in the case of scarce resources, a social planner may
be interested in equality in consumption (e.g., equality in water access), not just equality in utility derived.
Second, it turns out mathematically that this is the welfare function maximized by convex pricing WE in
our model; the version where Φ(ρ,x) considers ui may be not be maximized by the resulting WE. This may
yield valuable qualitative insights about convex pricing; for example, does convex pricing lead to equality
with respect to consumption but not necessarily with respect to underlying utility?
CES welfare in healthcare. These welfare functions have also seen substantial use in healthcare under
the name of isoelastic welfare functions. This began with [46], largely motivated by concerns abeout purely
utilitarian approaches to healthcare (i.e., allocating resources to maximize total health in a community,
without concern for equality). Since these decisions can affect who lives and who dies, significant effort has
been invested into understanding the equality/efficiency tradeoff, with this class of welfare functions serving
as a theoretical tool [14, 33, 46]; see Section 2.1 for additional discussion. Despite the ongoing interest in
this tradeoff, the healthcare literature has not (to our knowledge) considered convex pricing as a mechanism
for balancing equality and efficiency.
More broadly, our work can be thought of as weaving together the previously disjoint threads of CES
welfare and convex pricing to provide theoretical support for the oft-cited but rarely quantified claim that
IBTs promote equality.
2 Results and related work
Main result: convex pricing implements CES welfare maximization in Walrasian equilibrium.
Our main result is that for convex pricing of the form p(xi) = (
∑
j qjxij)
1/ρ for any ρ ∈ (0, 1]4, a Walrasian
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, and every WE maximizes CES welfare with respect to ρ. This holds for
a wide range of agent valuations.
Theorem 4.1 (Simplified version). Assume each valuation is homogeneous of degree r,5 differentiable, and
concave, and fix ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) maximizes CES welfare if and only if there
3To our knowledge, only three other computational economics papers have studied CES welfare in any context: [2, 21, 35].
4The case of ρ < 0 is slightly unintuitive, as it can result in agents who care more receiving less of the good. Consequently,
implementation in WE is impossible; see Theorem 8.3.
5A valuation is homogeneous of degree r if scaling any bundle by a constant c scales the resulting value by cr.
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exist constants q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0 such that for the pricing rule
p(xi) =
(∑
j
qjxij
)1/ρ
,
x and p form a WE.
Note that the ρ in p(xi) is the same ρ for which CES welfare is maximized.
We call the reader’s attention to two important aspects of this result. Perhaps most importantly, our
result is not simply a reformulation of the First Welfare Theorem: although maximizing CES welfare for
valuations v1, . . . , vn is equivalent to maximizing utilitarian welfare for valuations v
ρ
1 , . . . , v
ρ
n, the First Welfare
Theorem does not say anything about the agent demands in response to this convex pricing rule. The First
Welfare Theorem also does not help with identifying the exact conditions under which Theorem 4.1 holds,
e.g., homogeneity of valuations.6
Secondly, the class of homogeneous, differentiable, and concave valuations is quite large: it generalizes
most of the commonly studied valuations, e.g., linear, Cobb-Douglas, and CES (note that here we are referring
to CES agent valuations, not CES welfare functions). Although Leontief valuations are not differentiable,
we handle them as a special case and show that the same result holds (Theorem B.1).
The following additional properties are of note:
1. For this class of utilities, Theorem 4.1 generalizes the First Welfare Theorem:7 when ρ = 1, p(xi) yields
linear pricing and CES welfare yields utilitarian welfare.
2. The constants q1, . . . , qm will be the optimal Lagrange multipliers for a convex program maximizing
CES welfare. This connection to duality will be very helpful for computing these WE (see Section 5).
3. Our pricing rule is strictly convex for ρ < 1, with the curvature growing as ρ goes to 0. The smaller
ρ gets, the easier it is to buy a small amount, but the harder it is to buy a large amount. Intuitively,
this should prevent any single individual from dominating the market and lead to a more equitable
outcome. Furthermore, the marginal price at xi = 0 is zero, which ensures that everyone ends up
with a nonempty bundle (in contrast to linear pricing: see Figure 1). Theorem 4.1 provides a tight
relationship between the curvature of the pricing rule and the exact equality/efficiency tradeoff.
Towards an implementation. We also prove several supporting results: in particular, regarding imple-
mentation. The WE from Theorem 4.1 can always be computed by asking each agent for her entire utility
function, and then solving a convex program for maximizing CES welfare maximization to obtain the op-
timal Lagrange multipliers q1, . . . , qm. However, this is not very practical: people are generally not able
to articulate a full cardinal utility function, and even if they are, doing so could require transmitting an
enormous amount of information. Section 5 presents our first supporting result: an iterative algorithm for
computing the WE, where in each step, each agent only needs to report the gradient of her valuation at the
current point. Our algorithm is based on the ellipsoid method, and inherits its polynomial-time convergence
properties. We recognize that even valuation gradient queries may be difficult for agents to answer, and we
leave the possibility of an improved implementation – in particular, a taˆtonnement8 – as an open question.
Truthfulness. Our second supporting result considers a different approach to implementation: truthful
mechanisms. Walrasian equilibria are generally not truthful: agents can lie about their preferences to affect
the equilibrium prices for their personal gain.9 For ρ = 1, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is
known to truthfully maximize utilitarian welfare [32]. For the case of a single good and any ρ ∈ (0, 1), we
give a mechanism which truthfully maximizes CES welfare (Theorem 6.1). We also show that our mechanism
6In fact, not only is homogeneity necessary, but homogeneity of the same degree is necessary: if we allow the degree of
homogeneity to differ across agents, the result no longer holds (Theorem 8.2).
7One direction of the First Welfare Theorem (if (x, p) is a linear pricing WE, then x maximizes utilitarian welfare) holds in
a much more general setting; see Appendix C.
8A taˆtonnement is an iterative algorithm which only asks demand queries, i.e., what would each agent purchase given the
current prices. Demand queries may be easier to answer than the valuation gradient queries in our algorithm.
9Another interpretation is that WE assumes agents are price-taking (i.e., treat the prices are given and do not lie about
their preferences to affect the equilibrium prices) and breaks down when agents are price-anticipating.
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is the unique truthful mechanism up to an additive constant in the payment rule (Theorem 6.2). The proof
of Theorem 6.2 is quite involved, and requires techniques from real analysis such as Kirszbraun’s Theorem
for Lipschitz extensions and the Fundamental Theorem of Lebesgue Calculus.
Negative results. We prove the following negative results. Most importantly, we show that for any ρ 6= 1,
linear-pricing WE can have arbitrarily poor CES welfare (Theorem 8.1); were this not the case, perhaps it
would suffice to simply use linear pricing and accept an approximation of CES welfare. Next, note that
Theorem 4.1 requires each agent’s valuation to be homogeneous with the same degree r. We show that
when agents’ valuations have different homogeneity degrees, there exist instances where no pricing rule can
implement CES welfare maximization in WE (Theorem 8.2), and thus our assumption is necessary. We also
show that CES welfare maximization cannot be implemented in WE for ρ < 0 (Theorem 8.3), and discuss
the special case of ρ = 0 (i.e., Nash welfare).
There is an additional crucial issue which any practical implementation of Theorem 4.1 would need to
address: Sybil attacks. A Sybil attack is when a selfish agent attempts to gain an advantage in a system
by creating fake identities [16]. Since the pricing rule from Theorem 4.1 is strictly convex for ρ < 1, an
agent can decrease her payment by masquerading as multiple individuals and splitting her purchase across
those identities.10 In Appendix 7, we propose a model for analyzing Sybil attacks in markets, and show
that if these attacks are possible, there exist instances where no pricing rule can implement CES welfare
maximization in WE (Theorem 7.3).11
Additional results. In Appendix A, we explore connections between our results in the quasilinear utility
model, and the Fisher market fixed-budget model. Appendix B shows that Theorem 4.1 extends to Leontief
valuations, which are not differentiable (so the main proof does not apply). Leontief valuations have been a
focus of prior work, so we find is worthwhile to handle this as a special case.
2.1 Related work
The study of markets has a long history in economics [1, 8, 19, 44, 47]. Recently, this topic has received
substantial attention in the computer science community as well (see [45] for an algorithmic introduction).
We first provide some important background on different market models and the First and Second Welfare
Theorems, and then move on to more recent related work.
Quasilinear markets and Fisher markets. There are two primary market models for divisible goods.
This paper considers the quasilinear utility model, where each agent can spend as much as she wants, and the
amount spent is incorporated into her utility function. The other predominant model is the Fisher market
model [8, 19], where each agent has a fixed budget constraint, and the amount spent does not affect her
resulting utility (as a result, each agent always spends exactly her budget). Although these two models share
many of the same conceptual messages, some of the technical results vary. See Appendix A for the technical
relationship between the two models with respect to WE and CES welfare maximization.
Since agents in Fisher markets always spend exactly their budgets, there is no way to elicit the absolute
scale of agent valuations. Nash welfare maximization is invariant to this type of scaling, but no other CES
welfare function is [29]. For this reason, the Fisher market model is not well suited to reason about other
welfare functions. In contrast, the quasilinear model does allow agents to express the absolute scale of their
valuation: specifically, by choosing how much to spend. That is one reason that we focus on the quasilinear
model for this paper. The other is that convex pricing is most easily applied to a small submarket of the
broader economy (e.g., water pricing), and quasilinear utility captures the fact that agents may wish to
spend money on other goods outside of this submarket. In contrast, Arrow and Debreu’s model (see below)
can arguably capture the entire economy, so there is nothing outside of the market to spend money on.
10In contrast, for ρ = 1, there is nothing to be gained by creating fake identities.
11There are combinations of parameters, however, where our pricing rule is naturally robust to Sybil attacks: in particular,
when vi(x)(1 − ρ) ≤ κ (where vi(x) is agent i’s value for the maximum CES welfare allocation and κ is the identity creation
cost). This suggests a natural way for an equality-focused social planner to choose a specific value for ρ: estimate the identity
creation cost and scale of valuations in the system of interest, and pick ρ to be as small as possible without incentivizing Sybil
attacks.
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The First and Second Welfare Theorems. Conceptually, the First Welfare Theorem establishes an
efficiency property that any WE must satisfy, and the Second Welfare Theorem deals with implementing
a wide range of allocations as WE. The two welfare theorems originate in the context of Arrow-Debreu
markets [1], which generalize Fisher markets to allow for (1) agents to enter the market with goods (as
opposed to just money)12 and (2) production of goods. The statements of the First and Second Welfare
Theorems in that model are, respectively, “Any (linear pricing) WE is Pareto optimal” and “Any Pareto
optimal allocation can be a (linear pricing) WE with transfers, i.e., under a suitable redistribution of initial
wealth”.
In the Fisher market and quasilinear utility models, the First Welfare Theorem can be strengthened to
“Any (linear pricing) WE maximizes budget-weighted Nash welfare” [17, 18, 45] and “Any (linear pricing)
WE maximizes utilitarian welfare”, respectively. The version of the Second Welfare Theorem stated above is
appropriate for Fisher markets, since agents’ budgets constitute the “initial wealth”. However, for quasilinear
utilities, there is no notion of initial wealth (alternatively, initial wealth is an additive constant in agents’
utilities which does not affect their behavior). Thus for quasilinear utilities, allowing transfers actually does
not affect the set of WE. This may seem counterintuitive, since the Second Welfare Theorem (which still
holds in this setting) states that any Pareto optimum can be a WE. However, Pareto optimality here is
referring to agents’ overall quasilinear utilities, not the agents’ valuations. It can be shown that the only
allocations which are Pareto optimal with respect to the quasilinear utilities are allocations maximizing
utilitarian welfare, which are already covered by the First Welfare Theorem (without transfers).
Thus on a technical level, the Second Welfare Theorem is not helpful in the world of quasilinear util-
ities. However, even when the Second Welfare Theorem is mathematically relevant, a centrally mandated
redistribution of wealth is often out of the question in practice.
The equality/efficiency tradeoff in healthcare. In Section 1.1, we discussed how CES welfare has been
studied from a theoretical perspective in healthcare [14, 33, 46]. There have also been several empirical studies
aiming to understand the general population’s view of the equality/efficiency tradeoff, with results generally
indicating a disapproval of purely utilitarian approaches to healthcare [15, 49]. For example, a survey of
449 Swedish politicians found widespread rejection of purely utilitarian decision-making in healthcare, and
under some conditions, the respondents were willing to sacrifice up to 15 of 100 preventable deaths in order
to ensure equality across subgroups [26].
CES welfare and α-fairness in networking. CES welfare functions have also enjoyed considerable
attention from the field of networking, under the name of α-fairness (the parameter α corresponds to 1− ρ
in our definition). The α-fairness notion was proposed by [27], motivated in part as a generalization of the
prominent proportional fairness objective (which is equivalent to Nash welfare) [23]. See [6] and references
therein for further background on α-fairness in networking. To our knowledge, a market-based understanding
was developed only for proportional fairness, starting with the seminal work of Kelly et al. [23].
Nonlinear market mechanisms and CES welfare maximization. We are aware of just two papers
studying market mechanisms for CES welfare functions: [21] and [35]. Like our work, both of these papers
explore nonlinear pricing rules, but unlike our work, only consider Leontief valuations. Furthermore, both
of those papers are in the Fisher market model and only achieve CES welfare maximization under strong
assumptions on the absolute scale of the agents’ valuations.13 In contrast, our main result holds for any
valuations that are homogeneous of degree r, differentiable, and concave, a much larger range of valuations.
(Leontief valuations are not differentiable, but we handle them as a special case in Appendix B and show that
our result still holds.) It is worth noting that [21] focuses on the WE model, whereas [35] considers strategic
agents and Nash equilibria. On a related note, we are not aware of any broader results regarding general
nonlinear pricing, i.e., what set of allocations can be implemented if we allow p(xi) to be any nondecreasing
function of xi (but still require anonymity)? This could be an interesting direction for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 formally defines the model. In Section 4, we
present our main result: a simple convex pricing rule implements CES welfare maximization in WE for
12These are known as “exchange markets” or “exchange economies”.
13In particular, that each agent’s weight for each good is either 0 or 1. This subclass of Leontief valuations is known as
“bandwidth allocation” valuations, where each good is a link in a network, and agents transmit data over fixed paths.
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ρ ∈ (0, 1] (Theorem 4.1). Section 5 presents an iterative algorithm for computing these WE. In Section 6, we
consider truthful mechanisms for CES welfare maximization. Section 7 discusses Sybil attacks, and Section 8
presents our negative results. At this point we conclude the main paper. Appendix A discusses connections
to Fisher markets, Appendix B shows that our main result extends to Leontief valuations, Appendix C
discusses the First Welfare Theorem in more detail, and Appendix D provides some proofs omitted from the
main paper.
3 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be a set of agents, and let M = {1, 2, . . .m} be a set of divisible goods. Throughout the
paper, we use i and k to refer to agents and j and ℓ to refer to goods. We need to determine an allocation
x ∈ Rn×m≥0 , where xi ∈ Rm≥0 is the bundle of agent i, and xij ∈ [0, 1]14 is the quantity of good j allocated to
agent i. An allocation cannot allocate more than the available supply: x is a valid allocation if and only if∑
i xij ≤ 1 for all j. We will also determine payments p1, . . . , pn, where pi is the payment charged to agent
i. Thus an outcome is an allocation x and payments p1, . . . , pn.
Agent i’s utility for a bundle xi is denoted by ui(xi) ∈ R. We assume that agents have quasilinear utility:
for an allocation x and payment pi, agent i’s utility is ui(xi) = vi(xi) − pi, where vi is agent i’s valuation.
When each agent’s payment only depends on the bundle she receives, i.e., pi = p(xi), we call p a pricing
rule. With the exception of Section 6, we will focus on pricing rules. For vi, we make the following standard
assumptions throughout the paper:
1. Nonzero: There exists a bundle xi such that vi(xi) > 0.
2. Montone: If xij ≥ yij for all j ∈M , then vi(xi) ≥ vi(yi).
3. Normalized: vi(0, . . . , 0) = 0.
Our positive results require the following three additional properties, which we will mention explicitly
whenever used:
4. Concave: For any bundles xi, yi and constant λ ∈ [0, 1], we have vi(λxi + (1 − λ)yi) ≥ λvi(xi) + (1 −
λ)ui(yi).
5. Homogeneous of degree r: for any bundle xi and constant λ ≥ 0, vi(λxi) = λrvi(xi). For 0 < r < 1,
this models diminishing returns. Note that homogeneity implies normalization, and for monotone and
concave vi, we must have r ≥ 0 and r ≤ 1 respectively.
6. Differentiable: for any bundle xi and all j ∈M , ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
is defined.
CES welfare. For multipliers a = (a1, a2 . . . an) ∈ Rn≥0 and ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], the (weighted) CES
welfare of an allocation x is Φa(ρ,x) =
(∑
i∈N aivi(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
. For ρ 6= 1, Φ is strictly concave in vi(xi) for all
i ∈ N , so every optimal allocation x has the same valuation vector v1(x1), . . . , vn(xn). We will use Ψa(ρ) to
denote CES welfare maximization, i.e., Ψa(ρ) = argmaxx∈Rm
≥0
:
∑
i xij≤1 ∀j
Φa(ρ,x). There may be multiple
optimal allocations (for example, if there is a good which no one values), so Ψa(ρ) denotes a set. Thus
x ∈ Ψa(ρ) denotes that x has maximum CES welfare. When each agent has the same multiplier (other than
Appendix A, this will always be the case), we simply write Φ(ρ,x) and Ψ(ρ).
As an illustrative example, consider a single good and valuations that are homogeneous of degree 1.
Utilitarian welfare results in the good being entirely allocated to agents with wi = maxk wk, with other
agents receiving nothing (see Figure 1). In contrast, for ρ < 1, the unique allocation maximum CES welfare
welfare gives the following bundle xi ∈ R>0 to each agent i (Lemma 6.2): xi = wi
ρ
1−ρ
∑
k wk
ρ
1−ρ
. One natural case
is ρ = 1/2, which results in a proportional allocation.
14Without loss of generality, we can normalize the supply of each good to be 1.
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Axiomatic characterization. CES welfare functions also admit an axiomatic characterization. Consider
the following axioms: (1) Monotonicity: if one agent’s valuation increases while all others are unchanged,
the welfare function should prefer the new allocation, (2) Anonymity: the welfare function should treat all
agents the same, (3) Continuity: the welfare function should be continuous.15, (4) Independence of common
scale: scaling all agent valuations by the same factor should not affect which allocations have better welfare
than others, (5) Independence of unconcerned agents: when comparing the welfare of two allocations, the
comparison should not depend on agents who have the same valuation in both allocations, and (6) The
Pigou-Dalton principle: when choosing between equally efficient allocations, the welfare function should
prefer more equitable allocations [12, 34].
Disregarding monotonic transformations of the welfare function (which of course do not affect which
allocations have better welfare than others), the set of welfare functions satisfying these axioms is exactly
the set of CES welfare functions with ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], including Nash welfare [29].16 This axiomatic
characterization shows that we are not just focusing on an arbitrary class of welfare functions: CES welfare
functions are arguably the most reasonable welfare functions.
Walrasian equilibrium. Given a pricing rule p, agent i’s demand set is defined byDi(p) = argmaxxi∈Rm≥0 ui(xi),
or equivalently, Di(p) = argmaxxi∈Rm≥0
(
vi(xi)− p(xi)
)
. Given an allocation x and payment rule p, (x, p) is
aWalrasian equilibrium (WE) if both of the following hold:
1. Each agent receives a bundle in her demand set: xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N .
2. The market clears: for all j ∈M ,∑i∈N xij ≤ 1, and for all j ∈M with nonzero cost,∑i∈N xij = 1.17
4 Main result
We begin with our main result: for a wide range of valuations and any ρ ∈ (0, 1], a simple convex pricing
rule leads to CES welfare maximization in Walrasian equilibrium. Our pricing rule has many additional
interesting properties; to avoid redundancy, we refer the reader back to our discussion in Section 2. On a
high level, the proof relies on the KKT conditions for CES welfare maximization and the KKT conditions
for each agent’s demand set, and uses Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions to conjoin the two. This
will result in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Assume each vi is homogeneous of degree r, concave, and differentiable. For any ρ ∈ (0, 1]
and any allocation x, we have x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if there exist q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0 such that for the pricing
rule
p(xi) = ρr
ρ−1
ρ
( ∑
j∈M
qjxij
)1/ρ
,
(x, p) is a WE. Furthermore, q1, . . . , qm are optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1.
4.1 Proof setup
We begin by setting up the two relevant convex programs and proving several lemmas. For valuations
v1 . . . vn, nonnegative multipliers a = a1 . . . an, and ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1], consider the following nonlinear
program for maximizing CES welfare:
max
x∈R
n×m
≥0
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
aivi(xi)
ρ (1)
15A slightly weaker version of continuity is often used: if an allocation x is strictly preferred to an allocation y, there should
be neighborhoods N(x) and N(y) such that every x′ ∈ N(x) is preferred to every y′ ∈ N(y). This weaker version only requires
a welfare ordering and does not require that this ordering be expressed by a function. However, any such ordering which also
satisfies the rest of our axioms is indeed representable by a welfare function [13], and so both sets of axioms end up specifying
the same set of welfare functions/orderings.
16This actually does not include max-min welfare, which satisfies weak monotonicity but not strict monotonicity.
17We say that good j has nonzero cost for j if there is a bundle xi such that xiℓ = 0 for all ℓ 6= j, but p(xi) > 0.
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s.t.
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M
Since the constraints are linear and the objective function is concave (since ρ ≤ 1), Program 1 is a convex
program. Program 1 depends on ρ, but we will leave this implicit when clear from context: we will simply
say “x is optimal for Program 1” as opposed to “x is optimal for Program 1 with respect to ρ”. Note also
that we are maximizing 1ρ
∑
i∈N aivi(xi)
ρ instead of the true CES welfare Φa(ρ,x) = (
∑
i∈N aivi(xi)
ρ)1/ρ;
this will lead to the same optimal allocation x and will simplify the analysis.
When a is not specified, we assume that a = 1. Nonuniform multipliers will only be used in Appendix A
when we consider connections to Fisher markets, but we include them here for completeness.
Next, consider each agent’s demand set given a pricing rule p:
Di(p) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0
(
vi(xi)− p(xi)
)
(2)
When p is convex (as in Theorem 4.1), −p is concave. Since vi is also concave, vi(xi) − p(xi) is concave,
so each agent’s demand set defines a convex program (Program 2). Program 2 depends on i, the agent in
question, but again we leave this implicit when it is clear from context.
We will also use the following theorem, due to Euler. We include a short proof in Appendix D.18
Theorem 4.2 (Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions). Let f : Rm≥0 → R be differentiable and ho-
mogenous of degree r. Then for any b = (b1, . . . bm) ∈ Rm≥0,
∑m
j=1 bj
∂f(b)
∂bj
= rf(b).
Before we state and prove Theorem 4.1, we note one other property: for a pricing rule of the form
p(xi) = c(
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ where c > 0, good j has nonzero cost (for the purposes of Walrasian equilibrium)
if and only if qj = 0.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is divided into three parts. The first part involves setting up the KKT conditions
for Programs 1 and 2. The second assumes that x ∈ Ψ(ρ) and proves that (x, p) is a WE, and the third
assumes that (x, p) is a WE and proves that x ∈ Ψ(ρ).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Part 1: Setup. Let q denote the vector (q1, . . . , qm) ∈ Rm≥0; then the Lagrangian of
Program 1 is L(x,q) = 1ρ
∑
i∈N vi(xi)
ρ−∑j∈M qj(∑i∈N xij − 1).19 Since Program 1 is convex and satisfies
strong duality by Slater’s condition, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality.
That is, x is optimal for Program 1 (which is equivalent to x ∈ Ψ(ρ)) if and only if there exist Lagrange
multipliers q ∈ Rm≥0 such that both of the following hold:20
1. Stationarity:
∂L(x,q)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all i, j. Furthermore, if xij > 0, the inequality holds with equality.
2. Complementary slackness: for all j ∈M , either ∑i∈N xij = 1, or qj = 0.
For a given (i, j) pair,
∂L(x,q)
∂xij
is equal to vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
−qj , so stationarity for Program 1 is equivalent
to: qj ≥ vi(xi)ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
for all i, j, and when xij > 0, the inequality holds with equality.
Next consider Program 2, which defines each agent’s demand set. This program has no constraints (other
than xi ∈ Rm≥0), so we can ignore complementary slackness. Thus by the KKT conditions, xi ∈ Di(p) if and
18The reason we provide a proof is that this theorem is often stated with the requirement of continuous differentiability, but
in fact only requires differentiability; to avoid any confusion, we provide a proof only using differentiability.
19The expert reader may notice that we have omitted the x ∈ Rm×n
≥0 constraint from the Lagrangian. We do this to slightly
simplify the analysis. The effect on the KKT conditions is that stationarity changes from “For all i, j, ∂L(x,q)
∂xij
= 0” to “For all
i, j, ∂L(x,q)
∂xij
≤ 0, and the inequality holds with equality when xij > 0”.
20The KKT conditions also include primal feasibility and dual feasibility. Since we will only work with valid allocations x
and nonnegative q1, . . . , qm, these two conditions are trivially satisfied.
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only if for every j ∈ M , ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ ∂p(xi)
∂xij
, and if xij > 0, the inequality holds with equality (stationarity).
We can explicitly compute the partial derivatives of p:
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= r
ρ−1
ρ qj
(∑
ℓ∈M qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ .
Part 2: Optimal CES welfare implies WE. Suppose that x ∈ Ψ(ρ). Then there exists q ∈ Rm≥0
such that qj ≥ vi(xi)ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
for all j, and qj = vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
whenever xij > 0. Using the latter in
combination with Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions, for each (i, j) pair we have
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= r
ρ−1
ρ qj
(∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
= qj
(
r−1
∑
ℓ:xiℓ>0
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
= qj
(
r−1
∑
ℓ:xiℓ>0
vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xiℓ
xiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
(stationarity for xiℓ when xiℓ > 0)
= qj
(
r−1vi(xi)
ρ−1
∑
ℓ∈M
∂vi(xi)
∂xiℓ
xiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
= qj
(
r−1vi(xi)
ρ−1rvi(xi)
) 1−ρ
ρ (Euler’s Theorem)
= qjvi(xi)
1−ρ
Thus
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= qjvi(xi)
1−ρ. Next, we claim that xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N . Fix an agent i; we show by case
analysis that xi satisfies stationarity (for Program 2) for each j ∈M .
Case 1: qj = vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
. Then
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= qjvi(xi)
1−ρ = vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
1−ρ =
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
, and we
are done.
Case 2: xij = 0 and qj ≥ vi(xi)ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
. Then similarly,
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= qjvi(xi)
1−ρ ≥ vi(xi)ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
1−ρ =
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
, and again we are done. Therefore xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N .
Since x is a valid allocation,
∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 for all j ∈M . This, combined with complementary slackness
for Program 1, is identical to the market clearing condition for Walrasian equilibrium. Thus we have shown
that if x ∈ Ψ(ρ), there exist q1, . . . , qm (which are optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1) such that
for pricing rule p as defined, (x, p) is a WE.
Part 3: WE implies optimal CES welfare. This is similar to Part 2. Suppose there exists q ∈ Rm≥0
such that for pricing rule p(xi) = ρr
ρ−1
ρ (
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ, (x, p) is a WE. Recall the partial derivatives of p:
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= qj
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ . We multiply each side by xijr
−1, and sum both sides over j:
r−1
∑
j∈M
xij
∂p(xi)
∂xij
=
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
r−1
∑
j∈M
qjxij
r−1
∑
j:xij>0
xij
∂p(xi)
∂xij
=
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
+1
Since (x, p) is a WE, we have xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N . Thus ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
∂p(xi)
∂xij
whenever xij > 0, so
r−1
∑
j:xij>0
xij
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
)1/ρ
r−1
∑
j∈M
xij
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
)1/ρ
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vi(xi) =
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
)1/ρ
(Euler’s Theorem)
vi(xi)
ρ−1 =
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) ρ−1
ρ
Using this in combination with
∂p(xi)
∂xij
= qj
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ , we get
qj =
∂p(xi)
∂xij
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) ρ−1
ρ
=
∂p(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
ρ−1
Next, we claim that (x,q) satisfies stationarity for Program 1. We proceed by case analysis for each (i, j)
pair. Stationarity for Program 2 implies that these are the only two possible cases.
Case 1:
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
∂p(xi)
∂xij
. In this case, qj =
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
ρ−1, and we are done.
Case 2: xij = 0 and
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ ∂p(xi)
∂xij
. In this case we have qj ≥ ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
ρ−1, and we are again done.
Thus (x,q) satisfies stationarity for Program 1. Furthermore, the second condition of Walrasian equi-
librium is again identical to the complementary slackness condition. We conclude that x ∈ Ψ(ρ), and that
q1, . . . , qm are optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1. This completes the proof.
The following corollary states that under this pricing rule, each agent’s resulting value will be propor-
tional to the her payment. This property will be helpful in future sections, and may also be interesting
independently.
Corollary 4.2.1. Assume each vi is homogeneous of degree r, concave, and differentiable, and let p(xi) =
(
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ for some q ∈ Rm≥0. Then if xi ∈ Di(p), p(xi) = ρrvi(xi).
Proof. As before, stationarity for Program 2 gives us
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
∂p(xi)
∂xij
whenever xij > 0. Also note that by
definition, p is homogeneous of degree 1/ρ. Using these two properties in combination with Euler’s Theorem,
we get
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
∂p(xi)
∂xij
for all j ∈M s.t. xij > 0
∑
j∈M
xij
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
=
∑
j∈M
xij
∂p(xi)
∂xij
rvi(xi) =
1
ρ
p(xi)
Multiplying both sides by 1/ρ completes the proof.
5 Towards an implementation
Theorem 4.1 guarantees the existence of Walrasian equilibria maximizing CES welfare, but says nothing
about how to find these equilibria. As discussed in Section 2, we could always explicitly ask each agent for
her valuation, and directly solve Program 1. However, agents are generally not able to articulate their entire
valuations, and even if they are, doing so could be extremely tedious.
In this section, we give an iterative algorithm for computing the WE given by Theorem 4.1. The algorithm
will just compute the optimal allocation; Lemma 5.1 shows how the equilibrium pricing rule can easily be
obtained once the optimal allocation is in hand. Our algorithm is computationally equivalent to running the
general-purpose ellipsoid method on Program 1, i.e., it explores the exact same sequence of allocations. The
key is that we are able to implement the ellipsoid method only using valuation gradient queries, i.e., “tell me
the gradient of your valuation at this point”. We immediately inherit the correctness and polynomial-time
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convergence properties of the ellipsoid algorithm. Throughout this section, we make the same assumptions
as in Theorem 4.1: each vi is concave, homogeneous of degree r, and differentiable.
First, recall that the pricing rule from Theorem 4.1 takes the form p(xi) = ρr
ρ−1
ρ (
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ. Since
ρ and r are constants, it suffices to compute q = q1, . . . , qm. Helpfully, Theorem 4.1 tells us that if q are
optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1, then (x, p) is a WE for any x ∈ Ψ(ρ). The next lemma states
if we know an x ∈ Ψ(ρ), and have access to the gradients of the agents’ valuations at x, we can determine
optimal Lagrange multipliers.
Lemma 5.1. Let x ∈ Ψ(ρ). Then we can determine optimal Lagrange multipliers q using only
∇v1(x1), . . . ,∇vn(xn).
Proof. First, using Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions (Theorem 4.2), we can obtain v1(x1), . . . , vn(xn)
using only ∇v1(x1), . . . ,∇vn(xn). Next, since x ∈ Ψ(ρ), the KKT conditions for Program 1 imply that when-
ever xij > 0, qj = vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
. Fix a j ∈M . If xij > 0 for some agent i, then qj = vi(xi)ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
. We
know all the values on the right hand side, so we can compute qj . if xij = 0 for all i ∈ N , then complementary
slackness implies that qj = 0.
Thus it suffices to find an allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ), which is equivalent to finding an x that is optimal for
Program 1. There are many iterative algorithms for solving convex programs of this form. Furthermore,
many only require (1) oracle access to the objective function and its gradient, and (2) a separation oracle21
for the constraint set (and no additional assumptions of strong convexity or other properties). For the sake
of specificity, we focus on the ellipsoid method [9], but any algorithm with these properties is sufficient for
our purposes.
Lemma 5.2 ([9]). Let f be a convex function and let X be a convex set. Consider the program minx∈X f(x).
Let E be a ball containing the minimum of f , and suppose there exists a polynomial-time separation oracle
for X . Then the ellipsoid method starting from E requires only oracle access to f and ∇f , and converges to
the minimum of f in polynomial time.
In our case, we have a trivial polynomial-time separation oracle: simply check each constraint to see if
it is violated. For the gradient of our objective function, we have
∂
∂xij
(
1
ρ
∑
i∈N vi(xi)
ρ
)
=
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
ρ−1.
By Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions (Theorem 4.2), we have
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
vi(xi)
ρ−1 =
∂vi(xi)
xij
(
r−1
∑
ℓ∈M
xiℓ
∂vi(xi)
xiℓ
)ρ−1
(3)
Similarly,
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)
ρ =
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
(
r−1
∑
j∈M
xij
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
)ρ
(4)
Therefore for any allocation x, we can compute both the objective function value and the gradient of
the objective function using only the gradients of v1, . . . , vn. The final ingredient we need is an initial ball
guaranteed to contain the optimum; we can simply enclose the entire feasible region in a ball of constant
radius.
Thus we get the following iterative algorithm for computing the equilibrium pricing rule:
1. Run the ellipsoid method (or any other suitable convex optimization algorithm) to solve Program 1.
2. At the start of each iteration, ask each agent i for the gradient of vi at the current point x.
3. Whenever the algorithm requires the gradient of the objective function at x, compute it via Equation 3.
4. Whenever the algorithm requires the objective function value at x, compute it via Equation 4.
Lemma 5.2 immediately implies correctness and polynomial-time convergence.
21A separation oracle is an algorithm which, given a point x and a convex set X , determines whether x ∈ X . If x 6∈ X , it
must return a separating hyperplane (if X is specified by a set of constraints, returning a violated constraint is sufficient).
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5.1 Eliciting the gradients of valuations
The above algorithm (as well as Lemma 5.1) requires us to have access the gradients of agents’ valuations.
We could simply ask each agent for this information explicitly; depending on the application domain, this
may or may not be reasonable. An alternative approach is to relate ∇vi(xi) to agent i’s willingness to pay.
For example, consider the following query to agent i: “Suppose you have already bought the bundle xi.
What is the smallest marginal price for good j such that you would not buy more of good j?” The KKT
conditions for agent i’s demand set imply that the answer to this question is exactly
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
(assuming that
the agent would not buy more if she is indifferent).
Such a query could be implemented in a variety of ways. One possibility would be gradually increasing
the hypothetical marginal price of good j in a continuous fashion, and asking agent i to say “stop” when
she would no longer buy more of good j (in a “moving-knife”-like fashion). Also, rather asking agents about
hypothetical marginal prices, one could build the necessary marginal prices into an actual pricing rule, e.g.,
even one as simple as p(xi) =
∑
j∈M cjxij . The choice of implementation would depend heavily on the
specific problem setting; our point here is that there are a variety of ways to elicit ∇vi(xi) via queries about
what agent i would purchase in different (hypothetical) situations.
6 Truthfulness
An alternative approach to implementation is via truthful mechanisms. Walrasian equilibria are generally
not truthful: agents can sometimes create more favorable equilibrium prices by lying about their preferences.
In this section, we present a truthful mechanism for optimizing CES welfare in the case of a single good
(Theorem 6.1), and show that it is unique up to additive constants in the payment rule (Theorem 6.2). Note
that uniqueness beyond additive constants in the payment rule can never be achieved without additional
assumptions (e.g., individual rationality), since such constants do not affect the behavior of agents.
Before formally stating and proving these results, we mention an important distinction between this
section and Section 5. Section 5 is an implementation of the WE from Theorem 4.1 (which we know
maximizes CES welfare). In contrast, the truthful mechanism from this section is an implementation of CES
welfare maximization directly, not an implementation of the WE from Theorem 4.1. Indeed, we know that
the payment rule from Theorem 4.1 is not truthful, so we must consider a different payment rule if we desire
truthfulness.
To define our truthful mechanism we need the following two lemmas, whose proofs appear in Appendix D.
The first states that for a single good, homogeneous and differentiable functions take a very simple form.
The second states that for a single good, the maximum CES welfare allocations take a very simple form;
also, for ρ 6= 1, the optimum is unique.
Lemma 6.1. Let f : R≥0 → R≥0 be differentiable and homogeneous of degree r. Then there exists c ∈ R≥0
such that f(x) = cxr.
Lemma 6.2. Let m = 1 and vi(xi) = wix
r
i for all i ∈ N where r ∈ (0, 1]. Then ρ ∈ (0, 1] and rρ 6= 1,
x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if
xi =
wi
ρ
1−rρ∑
k∈N wk
ρ
1−rρ
If x ∈ Ψ(ρ) and r = ρ = 1, then whenever xi > 0, wi = maxk∈N wk.
We now define our mechanism. For ρ = 1, the VCG mechanism truthfully maximizes utilitarian wel-
fare [32], so assume ρ ∈ (0, 1). We ask each agent i to report wi (where vi(xi) = wi ·xri ), assume the wi’s are
truthful, and output the (unique) optimal allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ) according to Lemma 6.2. Let b = b1, . . . , bn
be the vector of reported wi’s. We then charge each agent i the following payment:
22
pi(b) =
rρ
1− rρ
(∑
k 6=i
b
ρ
1−rρ
k
) ∫ bi
b=0
b
rρ
1−rρ(
b
ρ
1−rρ +
∑
k 6=i b
ρ
1−rρ
k
)r+1 db (5)
22Although this integral does not have a simple closed form, it can be expressed via the hypergeometric function.
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This payment is chosen so that the derivative of agent i’s utility at bi = wi is 0. In particular, let xi(b)
denote agent i’s bundle under reports b. Then we will have
∂vi(xi(b))
∂bi
= rwi
∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1, and
∂pi(b)
∂bi
=
rbi
∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1, so the derivative of agent i’s overall utility will be
∂ui(b)
∂bi
= r(wi − bi)∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1.
This will imply that it is optimal for agent i to truthfully report bi = wi.
Theorem 6.1. Assume m = 1, and that each vi is homogenous of degree r (with r publicly known), concave,
and differentiable. Then for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), there is a truthful mechanism which outputs an allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ).
Proof. Since VCG satisfies the claim for ρ = 1, assume ρ ∈ (0, 1). Let x(b) denote the allocation outputted
given reports b, and let xi(b) denote agent i’s bundle: formally, xi(b) =
bi
ρ
1−rρ
∑
k∈N bk
ρ
1−rρ
. Since m = 1,
Lemma 6.1 implies that for all i ∈ N , there exists wi ∈ R≥0 such that vi(x) = wi · xr for all x ∈ R≥0. Then
by Lemma 6.2, xi(b) ∈ Ψ(ρ), so it remains to prove truthfulness.
Since we assume that each agent’s valuation is not identically zero, we have wi > 0. Also, by concavity
and monotonicity of vi, we have r ∈ (0, 1]. Thus 0 < rρ < 1. Since we also have bi > 0, all denominators in
pi(b) are nonzero and thus pi(b) is well-defined.
Let vi(b) = vi(xi(b)) = wixi(b)
r for brevity, and let ui(b) = vi(b) − pi(b) denote agent i’s resulting
utility under bids b. Note that xi(b), vi(b), pi(b), and ui(b) are all differentiable with respect to bi. Also
let α =
ρ
1− rρ for brevity; then pi(b) = rα(
∑
k 6=i b
α
k )
∫ bi
b=0
brα
(bα +
∑
k 6=i b
α
k
)r+1
db and xi(b) =
bαi∑
k∈N b
α
k
.
To prove truthfulness, we need to show that wi ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0 ui(b), i.e., truthfully reporting wi is an
optimal strategy for agent i.23 Since ui(b) is differentiable with respect to bi, we have
∂ui(b)
∂bi
=
∂vi(b)
∂bi
−∂pi(b)
∂bi
.
The first term on the right hand side is
∂vi(b)
∂bi
= rwi
∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1
The second term is
∂pi(b)
∂bi
= rα
(∑
k 6=i
bαk
) brαi
(bαi +
∑
k 6=i b
α
k )
r+1
= rα
(∑
k 6=i
bαk
) brαi
(
∑
k∈N b
α
k )
r+1
= rα
(∑
k 6=i
bαk
) bαi
(
∑
k∈N b
α
k )
2
( bαi∑
k∈N b
α
k
)r−1
= rα
(∑
k 6=i
bαk
) bαi
(
∑
k∈N b
α
k )
2
xi(b)
r−1
Conveniently, we have
∂
∂bi
( bαi∑
k∈N b
α
k
)
= α
(∑
k 6=i b
α
k
) bα−1i
(
∑
k∈N b
α
k
)2
. Thus
∂pi(b)
∂bi
= rbi
∂
∂bi
( bαi∑
k∈N b
α
k
)
xi(b)
r−1
= rbi
∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1
Therefore
∂ui(b)
∂bi
= r(wi − bi)∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1
Since ∂xi(b)∂bi > 0 and xi(b)
r−1 > 0 for all bi, this implies
23Note that ui(b) is not concave in bi, since pi(b) is not convex in bi. Thus the KKT conditions do not apply, so we will
have to use a different approach.
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1. For all bi < wi,
∂ui(b)
∂bi
> 0.
2. For all bi > wi,
∂ui(b)
∂bi
> 0.
3. For bi = wi,
∂ui(b)
∂bi
= 0.
Therefore wi ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0 (in fact, wi is the unique maximizer). We conclude that the mechanism is
truthful.
From a technical standpoint, the harder task is proving that this mechanism is unique (up to additive
constants in the payment rule). We assume without loss of generality that the mechanism asks each agent i
to report wi, and let b = b1, . . . , bn be the vector of reported wi’s. We use the standard notation of (b−i, b
′
i)
to denote the vector where the ith entry is b′i, and the kth entry for each k 6= i is bk.
The proof takes a real analysis approach, with Kirszbraun’s Theorem for Lipschitz extensions [24] playing
a central role. On a high level, the proof proceeds as follows: (1) we establish some basic properties of the
payment rule, (2) we show that the payment rule must be Lipschitz continuous not including bi = 0, (3)
there exists a Lipschitz extension pˆi including bi = 0 (Kirszbraun’s Theorem), (4) since pˆi is Lipschitz, it
is differentiable almost everywhere and is equal to the integral of its derivative, (5) since it has the same
derivative (when defined) as the payment rule from Theorem 6.1, the payment rules are equal (up to the
constant of integration).
Theorem 6.2. Assume m = 1, and that each vi is homogenous of degree r (with r publicly known), concave,
and differentiable. Fix ρ ∈ (0, 1), and let Γ be a truthful mechanism which outputs an allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ).
Then the allocation rule is the same as in Theorem 6.1, and the payment rule pi(b) is the same up to an
additive constant.
Proof. Part 1: Setup and basic properties. Since there is a unique optimal allocation (Lemma 6.2), Γ
must take b = (b1, . . . , bn) as honest and output the same allocation x(b).
It remains to consider the payment rule. Let pi(b) denote the payment rule from Theorem 4.1, and let
p˜i(b) denote the payment rule for Γ. Given reports b, define vi(b) as before, and let ui(b) = vi(b)− p˜i(b) be
agent i’s resulting utility under Γ. From the point of view of a given agent i, the other agents’ reports b−i can
be treated as a constant. Thus for brevity, write xi(b) = xi(b−i, b), pi(b) = pi(b−i, b), and p˜i(b) = p˜i(b−i, b)
for each i ∈ N .
Fix an i ∈ N . Since Γ is truthful, we must have wi ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0 ui(b). Then by definition of ui(b),
we have wi ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0
(
wixi(bi)
r − p˜i(bi)
)
. Since wi could be any element of R>0, and Γ must be
agnostic to wi, we must have b ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0
(
bxi(bi)
r − p˜i(bi)
)
for all b ∈ R>0.
We first claim that p˜i(b) is nondecreasing. Suppose the opposite: then there exists exists b > b
′ such that
p˜i(b) < p˜i(b
′). But this means that if wi = b
′, reporting bi = wi is never an optimal strategy, because the
payment can be decreased by reporting bi = b, and xi(b) ≥ xi(b′) (since xi(b) is nondecreasing). Thus p˜i(b)
is nondecreasing.
Part 2: p˜i is Lipschitz continuous. Fix an arbitrary bi > 0. Since bk > 0 for all k 6= i, it can be seen
from the definition of xi(b) that xi(b)
r is continuously differentiable on [0, bi]. Therefore the maximum of
dxi(b)
r
db
is a Lipschitz constant for xi(b)
r, so xi(b)
r is Lipschitz continuous on [0, bi]. Let κ be this Lipschitz
constant: then for all b, b′ ∈ [0, bi], |xi(b)r − xi(b′)r| ≤ κ|b− b′|.
We claim that p˜i is Lipschitz continuous on (0, bi] with constant biκ. Suppose the opposite: then there
exist b, b′ ∈ (0, bi] such that |p˜i(b)− p˜i(b′)| > biκ|b− b′|. Assume without loss of generality that b > b′. Since
p˜i and xi are both nondecreasing, we then have p˜i(b)− p˜i(b′) > biκ(b − b′) and xi(b)r − xi(b′)r ≤ κ(b− b′).
Since b ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0
(
bxi(bi)
r − p˜i(bi)
)
, we have bxi(b)
r − p˜i(b) ≥ bxi(b′)r − p˜i(b′) and thus b(xi(b)r −
xi(b
′)r) ≥ p˜i(b)− p˜i(b′). Therefore
bκ(b− b′) ≥ b(xi(b)r − xi(b′)r) ≥ p˜i(b)− p˜i(b′) > biκ(b− b′)
Therefore
bκ
biκ
> 1, which contradicts b ≤ bi. Therefore p˜i is Lipschitz continuous on (0, bi].
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Part 3: Kirszbraun’s Theorem. Thus by Kirszbraun’s Theorem [24], p˜i has a Lipschitz extension to
[0, bi]: that is, there exists pˆi : [0, bi]→ R≥0 such that pˆi is Lipschitz continuous on [0, bi], and pˆi(b) = p˜i(b)
for b ∈ (0, bi].
Part 4: pˆi is the integral of its derivative. Lipschitz continuity implies absolute continuity [38], so
pˆi is absolutely continuous on [0, bi]. Thus by the Fundamental Theorem of Lebesgue Calculus [38], pˆi is
differentiable almost everywhere on [0, bi], its derivative
dpˆi(b)
db
is integrable over [0, bi], and
pˆi(bi)− pˆi(0) =
∫ bi
b=0
dpˆi(b)
db
db
Part 5: The derivatives of pˆi and pi match, so pˆi = pi + c. Consider a b > 0 at which pˆi
is differentiable. Then p˜i is also differentiable, so b ∈ argmaxbi∈R>0
(
bxi(bi)
r − p˜i(bi)
)
implies
dp˜i(b)
db
=
b
d
db
(xi(b)
r) = rb
dxi(b)
db
xi(b)
r−1.24 We showed in the proof of Theorem 6.1 that
∂pi(b)
∂bi
= rbi
∂xi(b)
∂bi
xi(b)
r−1;
equivalently,
dpi(b)
db
= rbdxi(b)db xi(b)
r−1. Therefore for all b > 0 at which pˆi is differentiable, we have
dpˆi(b)
db
=
dpi(b)
db
.
Since pˆi is differentiable almost everywhere, we have
dpˆi(b)
db
=
dpi(b)
db
almost everywhere. Thus
dpi(b)
db
is
also integrable over [0, bi], and
∫ bi
b=0
dpi(b)
db
db =
∫ bi
b=0
dpˆi(b)
db
db [38]. Therefore
pˆi(bi) = pˆi(0) +
∫ bi
b=0
dpi(b)
db
db
= pˆi(0) + pi(bi)
where the second equality is from the definition of pi(b).
Therefore for all bi > 0, p˜i(bi) = pˆi(0)+ pi(bi), and so p˜i(b) = pˆi(0)+ pi(b) for all b. Since this holds for
all i ∈ N , p˜i(b) is exactly the payment rule from Theorem 6.1, up to the additive constant of pˆi(0).
It is worth noting that this truthful payment rule is quite complex; in particular, it may be hard to
convince agents that it is actually in their best interest to be truthful. In contrast, the Walrasian pricing
rule from Theorem 4.1 is much simpler and more intuitive. That pricing rule is not truthful, but perhaps
formal truthfulness is not crucial if a practical iterative implementation is possible. We do not claim that
our algorithm from Section 5 is truly practical, but it could be a step in the right direction.
7 Sybil attacks
In Sections 5 and 6, we discussed two alternative approaches to implementation: an iterative query-based
algorithm, and a truthful mechanism. However, there is an additional crucial issue which any practical
implementation must address: since our pricing rule p(xi) = (
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ is strictly convex for ρ < 1,
agents have an incentive to create fake identities. In particular, an agent can decrease her payment while
receiving the same bundle by splitting the payment over multiple fake identities.25 This is known as a Sybil
attack. The truthful payment rule from Section 6 is not strictly convex everywhere, but it is strictly convex
on some intervals, and thus has the same vulnerability.
Model of Sybil attacks. We model this as follows. Let κ denote the cost of creating a new identity. The
cost could reflect inconvenience, risk of getting caught, or other factors, and would depend on the nature
of the system. Let ηi be the multiplicity of agent i, i.e., the number of identities agent i controls in the
system. This includes both fake identities and the agent’s single real identity, so we assume that ηi ∈ N>0.
24Note that the b in bxi(bi)r is a constant from the point of view of the argmax, so it is treated as a constant by the derivative.
To be technically precise, we have ( d
dbi
bxi(bi)
r)|bi=b = rb
dxi(b)
db
xi(b)
r−1.
25Note that for linear prices there is no such incentive.
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For convex p, multiplicity ηi, and a desired bundle for purchase, it is always optimal for agent i to split the
purchase evenly across her identities.26 Thus we can assume that each identity purchases the same bundle
xi, and we define agent i’s utility as
ui(xi, ηi) = vi(ηixi)− ηip(xi)− ηiκ
We do not claim that this perfectly models the reality of Sybil attacks; for example, the identity creation cost
is arguably sublinear (one someone has created a single fake identity, creating more might become easier).
Our goal here is simply to show formally that at least in some cases, CES welfare maximization cannot be
robust to Sybil attacks in general.
Walrasian equilibrium. We focus on a Walrasian model of Sybil attacks; the analogous analysis for
truthful mechanisms is left as an open question. We define each agent’s Sybil demand set by
Di(p) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0,ηi∈N>0
ui(xi, ηi)
Note that we require ηi ∈ N>0. We define a Sybil Walrasian equilibrium (SWE) to be an allocation x,
payment rule p, and vector of multiplicities η = η1, . . . , ηn such that
1. Each agent receive a bundle in her demand set: (xi, ηi) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N .
2. The market clears: for all j ∈ M , ∑i∈N xij ≤ 1. Furthermore, for any j ∈ M with nonzero cost27,∑
i∈N xij = 1.
In this section, we will focus on the case of homogeneity degree r = 1. The following lemma states that
for any pricing rule, a rational agent either creates no fake identities (i.e, ηi = 1), or creates an unbounded
number (and consequently the demand set is empty).
Lemma 7.1. Assume each vi is concave, differentiable, and homogeneous of degree 1. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1], define
p as in Theorem 4.1, and let x ∈ Ψ(ρ). Then we have
Di(p) =
{
(xi, 1) if vi(xi)(1− ρ) ≤ κ
∅ otherwise
where xi is agent i’s bundle in x.
Proof. When vi is homogeneous of degree 1, for any bundle yi, we have ui(yi, ηi) = ηivi(yi)− ηip(yi)− ηiκ =
ηi
(
vi(yi) − p(yi) − κ
)
. Thus given a choice of ηi, yi must be chosen to maximize vi(yi) − p(yi) − κ. Let
x ∈ Ψ(ρ): then by Theorem 4.1 yi optimizes vi(yi)− p(yi) (and thus vi(yi)− p(yi)−κ) if and only if yi = xi.
Therefore the demand set is equal to
Di(p) =
(
xi, argmax
ηi∈N>0
ηi
(
vi(xi)− p(xi)− κ
))
That is, the demanded bundle must always be xi, and ηi is optimized accordingly.
By Corollary 4.2.1, p(xi) = ρvi(xi), so vi(xi)− p(xi) − κ = vi(xi)(1 − ρ)− κ. Thus if vi(xi)(1 − ρ) ≤ κ,
then 1 is an optimal choice for ηi, so (xi, 1) ∈ Di(p). However, if vi(xi)(1−ρ) > κ, there is no optimal choice
for ηi: specifically, ηi goes to infinity. Thus if vi(xi)(1− ρ) > κ, Di(p) = ∅.
This immediately implies that if x ∈ Ψ(ρ) satisfies vi(xi)(1 − ρ) ≤ κ for all i ∈ N , the convex pricing
rule from Theorem 4.1 is naturally robust to Sybil attacks.
Theorem 7.1. Assume each vi is concave, differentiable, and homogeneous of degree 1. Let x ∈ Ψ(ρ) for
ρ ∈ (0, 1], and define p as in Theorem 4.1. Then if vi(xi)(1 − ρ) ≤ κ for all i ∈ N , (x, p,1) is a SWE.
26This is essentially a multidimensional version of Jensen’s inequality; see, e.g., [31].
27Recall that good j has “nonzero cost” in our pricing rule if qj > 0.
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Proof. By Lemma 7.1, we have (xi, 1) ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N in this case. Theorem 4.1 implies that the
market clearing condition is met, so (x, p,1) is a SWE.
In other words, if the identity creation cost is small, ρ is close to 1, and/or agents valuations are not too
large, we need not worry about Sybil attacks. As discussed in Section 2, this suggests one possible way for
a social planner to choose a value of ρ: estimate κ and the magnitude of valuations, and choose ρ to be as
small as possible without incentivizing Sybil attacks.
On the other hand, if vi(xi)(1 − ρ) > κ, how bad are the consequences? Theorem 7.2 states that an
agent’s valuation at equilibrium has a hard cap at
κ
1− ρ . This provides a hard maximum on the CES welfare
in any SWE with p thus defined: in particular, the CES welfare is at most
(∑
i∈N
(
κ
1−ρ
)ρ)1/ρ
= n1/ρ κ1−ρ .
In general, each vi(xi) (and thus the CES welfare) can be arbitrarily large, so Theorem 7.2 implies an
unbounded ratio between the optimal CES welfare and that of any SWE with this p.
Theorem 7.2. Assume each vi is concave, differentiable, and homogeneous of degree 1. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1], and
define p as in Theorem 4.1. Then for any allocation x and multiplicities η such that (x, p,η) is a SWE, we
have
vi(xi) ≤ κ
1− ρ
Proof. Suppose (x, p,η) is a SWE for some allocation x and multiplicities η: then each (xi, ηi) ∈ Di(p) for
all i ∈ N ; Thus Di(p) 6= ∅, so Lemma 7.1 implies that vi(xi)(1−ρ) ≤ κ, and consequently, vi(xi) ≤ κ1−ρ .
The next natural question is, can we circumvent this by using a different pricing rule? Theorem 7.3
answers this in the negative. The counterexample uses an instance with a single good; recall that xi denotes
a scalar in this case.
Theorem 7.3. Let m = 1, v1(x1) = wx1, and vi(xi) = xi for all i 6= 1. Let (x, p,η) be any SWE. Then for
all i 6= 1,
vi(xi) ≤ κ
w − 1
Proof. Let (x, p,η) be any SWE. Fix an arbitrary i ∈ N . As in Lemma 7.1, we have ui(xi, ηi) = ηi(vi(xi)−
p(xi)− κ). Since (xi, ηi) ∈ Di(p), we must have ηi ∈ argmaxη′i∈N>0 ηi(vi(xi)− p(xi)− κ) (note that we are
not assuming anything about the bundle xi). Since argmaxη′i∈N>0 η
′
i(vi(xi)−p(xi)−κ) cannot be the empty
set, we must have vi(xi) ≤ p(xi) + κ and ηi = 1.
Focusing on agent 1, we further claim that v1(xi) ≤ p(xi) + κ for any i 6= 1. Suppose not: then agent
1 could purchase xi and set η1 = ∞ to increase her utility. Thus v1(xi) ≤ p(xi) + κ for each i 6= 1. Now
looking at the optimization for i 6= 1, we have vi(xi) ≥ p(xi). Combining this with v1(xi) ≤ p(xi) + κ, we
get v1(xi) ≤ vi(xi) + κ.
Plugging in our definitions of v1 and vi6=1, we get wxi ≤ xi + κ, so xi(w − 1) ≤ κ. Substituting back in
the definition of vi, we get vi(xi) ≤ κ
w − 1 for all i 6= 1, as required.
Although the bound in Theorem 7.3 is different from that in Theorem 7.2, the implication is the same:
this is a hard maximum on the value obtained by any agent other than agent 1. As κ goes to zero, the
fraction of the good agent 1 receives approaches 1, so the outcome approaches the maximum utilitarian
welfare outcome (where agent 1 receives the entirety of the good). Therefore by Theorem 8.1, the CES
welfare at any Sybil Walrasian equilibrium (for any pricing rule) can be arbitrarily bad in comparison to the
optimal CES welfare. Thus in general, when Sybil attacks are possible, it is impossible to implement any
bounded approximation of CES welfare maximization in Walrasian equilibrium.
8 Negative results
Even when Sybil attacks are not possible, there are limitations to implementation in WE. This section
presents several relevant counterexamples.
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8.1 Linear pricing poorly approximates CES welfare for ρ 6= 1
Recall that for an allocation x, Φ(ρ,x) denotes the CES welfare of x. In contrast, Ψ(ρ) denotes the set of
allocations with optimal CES welfare with respect to ρ.
Our first negative result relates to linear pricing. In particular, can linear pricing guarantee a reasonable
approximation of CES welfare? We show that the answer is no, justifying the need for nonlinear pricing.
In particular, for any ρ ∈ (0, 1), the gap between the CES welfare of any linear pricing equilibrium and the
optimal CES welfare can be arbitrarily large.
Note that as ρ goes to zero, 1ρ − 1 goes to infinity, so the denominator of the bound (and thus the gap in
CES welfare) in the following theorem can indeed be arbitrarily large.
Theorem 8.1. Let m = 1, ρ ∈ (0, 1], v1(x) = (1+ ε)x for some ε > 0, and vi(x) = x for all i 6= 1. Suppose
(x, p) is a WE where p is linear. Then
Φ(ρ,x)
maxy Φ(ρ,y)
≤ 1 + ε
n
1
ρ
−1
Proof. By the First Welfare Theorem, x must maximize utilitarian (i.e., ρ = 1) welfare. Thus by Lemma 6.2,
x must give the entire good to agent 1: x1 = 1 and xi = 0 for i 6= 1. Thus the CES welfare of x with respect
to ρ is
Φ(ρ,x) =
(∑
i∈N
vi(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
=
(
(1 + ε)ρ
)1/ρ
In contrast, consider the allocation y such that yi = 1/n for all i ∈ N :
Φ(ρ,y) =
(∑
i∈N
vi(1/n)
ρ
)1/ρ
≥
(∑
i∈N
(1/n)ρ
)1/ρ
=
(
n(1/n)1/ρ
)1/ρ
= n
1
ρ
−1
Thus maxy Φ(ρ,y) ≥ n 1ρ−1, as required.
8.2 Theorem 4.1 does not extend to nonuniform homogeneity degrees
In this section, we show that for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), Theorem 4.1 does not extend to the case where different vi’s
have different homogeneity degrees. This shows that our result is tight in the sense that it is necessary to
require the same homogeneity degree.
We begin with the following lemma, which is a standard property of strictly concave and differentiable
functions: it essentially states that any such function is bounded above by any tangent line. This lemma is
sometimes called the “Rooftop Theorem”.
Lemma 8.1. Let f : R → R be strictly concave and differentiable. Then for all a, b ∈ R where a 6= b,
f(a) < f(b) + f ′(b)(a− b), where f ′ denotes the derivative of f .
The next lemma is also quite standard; we provide a proof for completeness.
Lemma 8.2. Let f : R→ R be strictly concave and differentiable, and let x, a1, . . . , ak be nonnegative reals
such that
∑k
i=1 ai = 0. Then
∑k
i=1 f(x+ ai) < kf(x).
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 8.1 and arithmetic:
k∑
i=1
f(x+ ai) <
k∑
i=1
(f(x) + f ′(x)(x + ai − x))
=
k∑
i=1
f(x) + f ′(x)
k∑
i=1
ai
=
k∑
i=1
f(x) + f ′(x) · 0
= kf(x)
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We are now ready to present our counterexample.
Theorem 8.2. Let n = 2 and m = 1, and for x ∈ R≥0, let v1(x) = x and v2(x) =
√
2x. Then for all
ρ ∈ (0, 1), there exists no allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ) and pricing rule p : R≥0 → R≥0 such that (x, p) is a WE.
Proof. Suppose for sake of contradiction that such x, p do exist. We first claim that x1 > x2. Suppose the
opposite: then x2 ≥ 1/2 ≥ x1. Thus v2(x2) ≥ 1 > 1/2 ≥ v1(x1). We also have ∂v2(x2)
∂x2
=
1√
2x2
≤ 1 = ∂v1(x1)
∂x1
.
Thus v2(x2) > v1(x2) and
∂v2(x2)
∂x2
≤ ∂v1(x1)
∂x1
. Since ρ < 1, ρ − 1 < 0, so we have v2(x2)ρ−1 ∂v2(x2)
∂x2
<
v1(x1)
ρ−1 ∂v1(x1)
∂x2
. But this contradicts x ∈ Ψ(ρ), so we have x1 > x2 as claimed.28
Since (x, p) is a WE, we must have xi ∈ Di(p) for both agents i. Thus for any x 6= xi, vi(xi) − p(xi) ≥
vi(x)− p(x). Therefore
v1(x1)− p(x1) ≥ v1(x2)− p(x2) and v2(x2)− p(x2) ≥ v2(x1)− p(x1)
v1(x1) + v2(x2)− p(x1)− p(x2) ≥ v1(x2) + v2(x1)− p(x1)− p(x2)
v1(x1) + v2(x2) ≥ v1(x2) + v2(x1)
v1(x1)− v1(x2) ≥ v2(x1)− v2(x2)
Since x1 > 1/2 > x2 and x1+x2 = 1, let x1 = 1/2+ ε and x2 = 1/2− ε. Then we have v1(x1)− v1(x2) = 2ε.
For v2(x1)− v2(x2), we have
v2(x1)− v2(x2) =
√
1 + 2ε−√1− 2ε
=
(
√
1 + 2ε−√1− 2ε)(√1 + 2ε−√1− 2ε)√
1 + 2ε+
√
1− 2ε
=
(1 + 2ε)− (1− 2ε)√
1 + 2ε+
√
1− 2ε
=
4ε√
1 + 2ε+
√
1− 2ε
Applying Lemma 8.2 with f(x) =
√
x, x = 1, k = 2, and (a1, a2) = (2ε,−2ε), we get
√
1 + 2ε+
√
1− 2ε < 2.
Thus v2(x1)− v2(x2) > 4ε/2 = 2ε = v1(x1)− v1(x2). However, this contradicts v1(x1) − v1(x2) ≥ v2(x1)−
v2(x2), as we showed above. We conclude that there is no x ∈ Ψ(ρ) and pricing rule p such that (x, p) is a
WE.
8.3 CES welfare maximization for ρ ≤ 0
In this section, we show that there is no pricing rule supporting CES welfare maximization for any ρ < 0.
For ρ = 0 (i.e., Nash welfare), the situation is slightly different. We do show, however, that Nash welfare
maximization cannot be supported by a differentiable pricing rule.
Theorem 8.3. Consider the instance with n = 2, m = 1, v1(x) = x and v2(x) = 2x. Then for every ρ < 0,
there is no pricing rule p and allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ) such that (x, p) is a WE.
Proof. For any ρ < 0 and any x ∈ Ψ(ρ), we must have x1 > x2. Assume (x, p) is a WE for some pricing rule
p: then x1 ∈ D1(p), so v1(x1)−p(x1) ≥ v1(x2)−p(x2). Thus p(x1) ≤ p(x2)+v1(x1)−v2(x2) = p(x2)+x2−x1.
Therefore
v2(x1)− p(x1) ≥ 2x1 − (p(x2) + x2 − x1)
= 3x1 − x2 − p(x2)
> 2x1 − p(x2)
> 2x2 − p(x2)
28This immediately implies
∂v2(x2)
∂x2
< 1 =
∂v1(x1)
∂x1
, which, in combination with x1 > x2, rules out convex p. However, we
still need to rule out non-convex p.
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= v2(x2)− p(x2)
Thus agent 2 would rather purchase x1 than x2, so x2 6∈ D2(p). Therefore (x, p) is not a WE.
For ρ = 0, the situation is different. Recall that Fisher market equilibrium always maximizes Nash
welfare, and we can simulate Fisher market budgets by setting
p(xi) =
{
0 if
∑
j∈M qjxij ≤ 1
∞ otherwise
where q1 . . . qm are the optimal Lagrange multipliers in the convex program for maximizing Nash welfare.
Gale and Eisenberg’s famous result implies that for such a pricing rule, a WE always exists, and all WE
maximize Nash welfare [17, 18]. Note that for
∑
j∈M qjxij > 1, p(xi) = ∞ can be implemented by setting
∂p(xi)
∂xij
to be at least maxi∈N maxxi∈[0,1]m
∂vi(xi)
∂xij
. This ensures that no agent purchases a bundle xi such
that
∑
j∈M qjxij > 1.
The above pricing rule is somewhat artificial, however. One natural question is whether Nash welfare
maximization can be implemented with a differentiable pricing rule. We next show that the answer is no.
Theorem 8.4. Consider the instance with n = 2, m = 1, v1(x) = x and v2(x) = 2x. Then there is no
allocation x maximizing Nash welfare and differentiable pricing rule p such that (x, p) is a WE.
Proof. Suppose the opposite: that such x, p exist. The unique x maximizing Nash welfare must have
x1 = x2 = 1/2. Since p, v1, and v2 are all differentiable, we have xi ∈ Di(p) if and only if dp(xi)dxi =
dvi(xi)
dxi
.
Since x1 = x2, we have
dp(x1)
dx1
=
dp(x2)
dx2
. Thus implies
dv1(x1)
dx1
=
dv2(x2)
dx2
, which is a contradiction. We
conclude that no such x, p exist.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a simple family of convex pricing rules, motivated by the widespread use of
convex pricing in the real world, especially for water. We proved that these pricing rules implement CES
welfare maximization in Walrasian equilibrium, providing a formal quantitative interpretation of the frequent
informal claim that convex pricing promotes equality. Furthermore, by tweaking the exponent of the pricing
rule, the social planner can precisely control the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. This result also
shows that convex pricing is not necessarily economically inefficient, as often claimed; it simply maximizes
a different welfare function than the traditional utilitarian one.
Improved implementation is perhaps the most important of the future directions we propose. One concrete
possibility is a taˆtonnement : an iterative algorithm where on each step, each agent reports her demand for
the current pricing rule, and the pricing rule is adjusted accordingly. Demand queries are arguably easier
for agents to answer than valuation gradient queries. Some implementation questions – in particular, how
to deal with Sybil attacks – would likely need to be handled on a case-by-case basis.
Aside from the implementation itself, there is the additional challenge of convincing market designers to
consider using this type of convex pricing. Equality is generally thought to be desirable, but sellers may
be concerned that this will decrease their revenue. In future work, we hope to show that our pricing rule
guarantees a good approximation of the optimal revenue for sellers.
Another possible direction would be CES welfare maximization for indivisible goods. The analogous
pricing rule would be p(S) = (
∑
j∈S qj)
1/ρ, where S is a set of indivisible goods. It seems like very different
theoretical techniques would be needed in this setting (along with perhaps a gross substitutes assumption),
but we suspect that the same intuition of convex pricing improving equality would hold.
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A Connections to Fisher markets
The focus of this paper is on markets for quasilinear utilities, where agents can spend as much money as
they want, and the amount spent is incorporated into their resulting utility. The other predominant market
model assumes each agent i has a finite budget Bi of money to spend, and has no value for leftover money
(in general, this implies that each agent i spends exactly Bi). This is called the Fisher market model.
29 In
this section, we explore connections between our results and the Fisher market model.
In the Fisher market model, each agent’s utility ui(xi) is simply vi(xi). For pricing rule p, the Fisher
market demand set is given by
DFi (p) = argmax
xi∈Rm≥0: p(xi)≤Bi
vi(xi)
We will reserve the notationDi(p) for the demand set in the quasilinear case, i.e.,Di(p) = argmaxxi∈Rm≥0(vi(xi)−
p(xi)).
For an allocation x, agent budgets B = (B1, . . . , Bn), and a pricing rule p, (x,B, p) is a Fisher market
Walrasian equilibrium if (1) xi ∈ DFi (p) for all i ∈ N , and (2)
∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 for all j ∈M , and if good j has
nonzero cost,
∑
i∈N xij = 1.
30 These are the same two conditions for Walrasian equilibrium in quasilinear
markets: the only change is the definition of the demand set. To distinguish, we will use the terms “Fisher
WE” and “quasilinear WE”.
A.1 CES welfare maximization in Fisher markets
In the quasilinear model, agents can express not only their relative values between goods, but also the
absolute scale of their valuation (i.e., the “intensity” of their preferences) by choosing how much money to
spend. In contrast, agents in the Fisher market model spend exactly their budget, and so have no way to
express the absolute scale of their valuation. This should make us pessimistic about the possibility of CES
welfare maximization in the Fisher market model in general. Indeed, consider a single good and two agents
with valuations v1(x) = x, v2(x) = 2x. For any ρ > 0, any optimal allocation x ∈ Ψ(ρ) has x2 > x1. But
if B1 = B2, any Fisher market Walrasian equilibrium will always have x1 = x2, since both agents simply
spend their entire budget on the single good.
However, in general we can convert a quasilinear WE to a Fisher WE if the agents’ budgets are sized
appropriately. Specifically, we need agent i’s budget to be exactly the amount she pays in the quasilinear
WE:
29There are also more general versions of this model that allow each agent’s initial endowment to be goods instead of money
(“exchange economies”) and/or allow production (“Arrow-Debreu markets”).
30Recall that good j has nonzero cost for j if there is a bundle xi such that xiℓ = 0 for all ℓ 6= j, but p(xi) > 0.
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Theorem A.1. Suppose (x, p) is a quasilinear WE, and let Bi = p(xi). Then (x,B, p) is a Fisher WE.
Proof. For all i ∈ N , xi is affordable to agent i under p by definition of Bi. Suppose there were another
bundle yi such that p(yi) ≤ Bi but vi(yi) > vi(xi). That would contradict xi ∈ Di(p) for the quasilinear
case, since ui(yi) = vi(yi) − p(yi) > vi(xi) − p(yi) ≥ vi(xi) − p(xi) = ui(xi). Therefore xi ∈ DFi (p) for all
i ∈ N . Furthermore, the market clearing conditions for Fisher WE and quasilinear WE are identical. We
conclude that (x,B, p) is a Fisher WE.
Combining the above result with Theorem 4.1 gives us the following corollary for CES welfare maximiza-
tion:
Corollary A.1.1. Assume each vi is homogeneous of degree r, concave, and differentiable. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1],
and p(xi) = ρr
ρ−1
ρ (
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ, where q1, . . . , qm are optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1. For
x ∈ Ψ(ρ), let Bi = p(xi) for all i ∈ N , Then (x,B, p) is a Fisher WE.
Perhaps the more interesting connection relates to the welfare function being optimized. In the case
of linear pricing, the Fisher market Walrasian equilibria are exactly the budget-weighted maximum Nash
welfare allocations.31 One natural question is whether the Fisher market equilibria from Theorem A.1 also
optimize a budget-weighted CES welfare function. We answer this in the affirmative. Recall that we define
ΦB(ρ,x) =
(∑
i∈N Bivi(xi)
ρ
)1/ρ
, and ΨB(ρ) = argmaxx ΦB(ρ,x).
Lemma A.1. Assume each vi is concave and differentiable. Let x
′ be any allocation, let ai = vi(x
′
i) for
each i ∈ N , and let ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then x′ ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if x′ ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1).
Proof. When ρ = 1, ρ − 1 = 0, so Program 1 does not apply, and we must handle this case separately. We
first consider ρ 6= 1. The Lagrangian for Program 1 for Ψa(ρ − 1) is L(x,q) = 1ρ−1
∑
i∈N aivi(xi)
ρ−1 −∑
j∈M qj(
∑
i∈N xij − 1). The KKT conditions imply that x ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1) if and only if there exist Lagrange
multipliers q1, . . . , qm such that:
1. Stationarity:
∂L(x,q)
∂xij
= aivi(xi)
ρ−2 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all i, j.32 Furthermore, if xij > 0, the inequality
holds with equality.
2. Complementary slackness: for all j ∈M , either ∑i∈N xij = 1, or qj = 0.
For Program 1 for Ψ(ρ), as before we have L′(x,q) = 1ρ
∑
i∈N vi(xi)
ρ −∑j∈M qj(∑i∈N xij − 1). Thus
the KKT conditions imply that x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if there exist q′1, . . . , q′m ∈ R≥0 such that (1)
vi(xi)
ρ−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ qj for all i, j, and when xij > 0, the inequality holds with equality, and (2) for all
j ∈ M , either ∑i∈N xij = 1, or qj = 0. Note that if qj = q′j for all j ∈ M , the complementary slackness
conditions become equivalent.
Next, for x = x′ we have
vi(x
′
i)
ρ−1 ∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
= vi(x
′
i)vi(x
′
i)
ρ−2 ∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
= aivi(x
′
i)
ρ−2 ∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
Therefore for given qj , we have qj ≥ vi(x′i)ρ−1
∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
if and only if qj ≥ aivi(x′i)ρ−2
∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
, and qj =
vi(x
′
i)
ρ−1 ∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
if and only if qj ≥ aivi(x′i)ρ−2
∂vi(x
′
i)
∂x′ij
.
Now suppose x′ ∈ Ψ(ρ). Then there exist q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0 that satisfy both stationarity and complemen-
tary slackness. Then as we showed above, x′ and q1, . . . , qm satisfy stationarity for Ψa(ρ− 1). Furthermore,
the complementary slackness conditions are equivalent, so we have x′ ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1).
Similarly, suppose x′ ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1). Then there exist q1, . . . , qm satisfying stationarity and complementary
slackness, so the same q1, . . . , qm along with x
′ satisfy the KKT conditions for Ψ(ρ). Therefore Ψ(ρ), and
we conclude that x′ ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if x′ ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1) for ρ 6= 1.
31Recall that Nash welfare corresponds to ρ = 0, and the budget-weighted Nash welfare of an allocation x is
∏
i∈N vi(xi)
Bi .
32Note that since x′ is a fixed allocation, ai is just some constant, so the differentiation does not affect it.
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All of the above was for ρ 6= 1; it remains to handle the case of ρ = 1. In this case, we can use the same
KKT conditions for Ψ(ρ), but must use a different convex program for Ψa(ρ − 1). Consider the following
convex program for maximizing Nash welfare (i.e., CES welfare for ρ = 0):
max
x∈R
n×m
≥0
∑
i∈N
ai log vi(xi) (6)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M
This is known as the Eisenberg-Gale program [17, 18]. In this case, the stationarity condition requires
that
∂
∂xij
ai log vi(xi) = aivi(xi)
−1 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ qj for all i, j, and when xij > 0, the inequality holds with
equality. Since ρ = 1 here, we have ρ− 2 = −1. Thus the stationarity condition for Ψa(ρ− 1) requires that
avi(xi)
ρ−2 ∂vi(xi)
∂xij
≤ qj for all i, j (and if xij > 0, this holds with equality). This is exactly what we had
above, and since we are using the same KKT conditions for Ψ(ρ), this case reduces to the case for ρ 6= 1.
Therefore for ρ = 1, x′ ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if x′ ∈ Ψa(ρ− 1).
Combining Theorem A.1 and Lemma A.1, we get:
Theorem A.2. Assume each vi is homogeneous of degree r, concave, and differentiable, let ρ ∈ (0, 1], let
q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0, and let p(xi) = ρ
(∑
j∈M qjxij
)1/ρ
. Given x ∈ Ψ(ρ), let Bi = p(xi). Then all of the
following hold:
1. (x, p) is a quasilinear WE.
2. (x,B, p) is a Fisher WE.
3. x ∈ ΨB(ρ− 1)
Proof. The first and second conditions hold by Theorems 4.1 and A.1, respectively. Then Corollary 4.2.1
implies that p(xi) = rρvi(xi). Let ai = vi(xi) =
Bi
rρ
. Thus by Lemma A.1, we have x ∈ Ψa(ρ − 1). Since
scaling all agents’ multipliers by the same factor does not affect Ψa(ρ − 1), we have x ∈ Ψrρa(ρ − 1) =
ΨB(ρ− 1), as required.
It is worth noting that the special case of Theorem A.1 for ρ = 1 and Leontief utilities with wij ∈ {0, 1}33
is implied by the work of Kelly et al. [23].
B CES welfare maximization for Leontief valuations
We say that vi is Leontief if there exist weights w1, . . . , wm ∈ R≥0 such that
vi(xi) = min
j: wij 6=0
xij
wij
Leontief valuations are not differentiable, and so Theorem 4.1 does not apply. In this section, we handle
Leontief valuations as a special case. Although there are many non-differentiable valuations we could con-
sider, there is substantial related work on Leontief valuations ([21, 35]), so we find it worthwhile to show
that our result does indeed extend to this case.
Recall Program 1:
max
x∈R
n×m
≥0
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)
ρ
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M
33This is also known as the bandwidth allocation setting, where each good represents a link in a network, and agent i has
wij = 1 for every link j on a fixed path (and wij = 0 otherwise).
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We will work with a specialized version of this for Leontief utilities:
max
x∈Rn×m
≥0
,α∈Rm
≥0
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
αρi (7)
s.t. wijαi ≤ xij ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M∑
i∈N
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M
where we use α to denote the vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn≥0.
Also recall each agent’s demand set Di(p) = argmaxxi∈Rm≥0
(
vi(xi)− p(xi)
)
. Similarly to Program 7, we
consider the following equivalent (specialized) convex program for agent i’s demand set:
max
xi∈Rm≥0,αi∈R≥0
(
αi − p(xi)
)
(8)
s.t. wijαi ≤ xij ∀j ∈M
Theorem B.1. Assume each vi is Leontief with weights wi1, . . . , wim. Then for any ρ ∈ (0, 1] and any
allocation x, we have x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if there exist q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0 such that for the pricing rule
p(xi) = ρ(
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ, (x, p) is a WE. Furthermore, q1, . . . , qm are optimal Lagrange multipliers (for the∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 constraints) for Program 7.
Proof. We first claim that in an optimal solution x,α to either Program 7 or Program 8, we have vi(xi) = αi
for all i ∈ N : that is, that these programs are doing what we want them to. To see this, note that
αi ≤ xij/wij for all j with wij 6= 0, so αi ≤ vi(xi). Furthermore, at least one constraint involving αi
must be tight: otherwise, we could increase αi and thus the objective value. In particular, we must have
αi = minj: wij 6=0
xij
wij
= vi(xi). Thus Program 8 is indeed maximizing vi(xi)−p(xi), so xi ∈ Di(p) if and only
if (xi, αi) is optimal for Program 8 (for some αi). Similarly, Program 7 is indeed maximizing
1
ρ
∑
i∈N vi(xi)
ρ
subject to
∑
i∈N xij ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M , so (x,α) is optimal for Program 7 if and only if x is optimal for
Program 1. Therefore x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if (x,α) is optimal for Program 7 (for some α).
Next, we write the Lagrangian of Program 7:34
L(x,α,q,λ) =
1
ρ
∑
i∈N
αρi −
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
λij(wijαi − xij)−
∑
j∈M
qj
(∑
i∈N
xij − 1
)
We have strong duality by Slater’s condition, so the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for
optimality. That is, (x,α) is optimal if and only if there exist q ∈ Rm≥0, λ ∈ Rm×n≥0 such that all of the
following hold:35
1. Stationarity for x:
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all i, j. Furthermore, if xij > 0, the inequality holds with
equality.
2. Stationarity for α:
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂αi
≤ 0 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, if αi > 0, the inequality holds with
equality.
3. Complementary slackness for q: for all j ∈M , either ∑i∈N xij = 1, or qj = 0.
4. Complementary slackness for λ: for all i ∈ N , j ∈M , either wijαi = xij or λij = 0.
Similarly, let L′i denote the Lagrangian of Program 8 for agent i:
L′i(xi, αi, λi) = αi − p(xi)−
∑
j∈M
λij(wijαi − xij)
where λi = (λi1, . . . , λim) ∈ Rm≥0. We again have strong duality, so the KKT conditions are again necessary
and sufficient. Let L′i(xi, αi, λi) denote the Lagrangian of this program; then (xi, αi) is optimal for Program 8
if and only if all of the following hold:
34As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we omit the x ∈ Rm×n
≥0 constraint from the Lagrangian incorporate it into the KKT
conditions instead.
35As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, primal and dual feasibility are trivially satisfied.
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1. Stationarity for xi:
∂L′i(xi, αi, λi)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all j ∈M . If xij > 0, the inequality holds with equality.
2. Stationarity for αi:
∂L′i(xi, αi, λi)
∂αi
≤ 0. If αi > 0, the inequality holds with equality.
3. Complementary slackness for λi: for all i ∈ N , j ∈M , either wijαi = xij or λij = 0.
We will claim that (x,α,q,λ) is optimal for Program 7 if and only if for all i ∈ N , (xi, αi, α1−ρi λi) is
optimal for Program 8. Essentially, we show that if complementary slackness holds (for either program), the
stationarity conditions are equivalent. To begin, we can explicitly compute the relevant partial derivatives
for given x,α,q,λ, with p(xi) = ρ(
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ:
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂xij
= λij − qj
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂αi
= αρ−1i −
∑
j∈M
λijwij
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂xij
= λ′ij − qj
( ∑
ℓ∈M
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂αi
= 1−
∑
j∈M
λ′ijwij
Part 1: ( =⇒ ) Suppose that x ∈ Ψ(ρ). Then there exist α,q,λ such that the KKT conditions for
Program 7 are satisfied for (x,α,q,λ). We first claim that αi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Suppose not: stationarity
implies that αρ−1i ≤
∑
j∈M λijwij , but since ρ − 1 < 0, the left hand side is not defined for αi = 0. Thus
αi > 0.
Therefore by stationarity for αi, we have α
ρ−1
i =
∑
j∈M λijwij . Let λ
′
ij = α
1−ρ
i λij for all i, j
36. Then
αρ−1i =
∑
j∈M λijwij is equivalent to 1 =
∑
j∈M λ
′
ijwij , and thus
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂αi
= 0 for all i ∈ N . Thus for
all i ∈ N , (xi, αi, λ′i) satisfies stationarity for αi for Program 8.
We now turn to the xij variables. Stationarity for xij in Program 7 implies that λij = qj whenever
xij > 0. Furthermore, complementary slackness for λij implies that if λij > 0, wijαi = xij . Thus whenever
qj > 0 and xij > 0, wijαi = xij and λij = qj . Therefore for all i, j,
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂xij
= λ′ij − qj
( ∑
ℓ:qℓ,xiℓ>0
qℓxiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
= λ′ij − qj
(∑
ℓ∈M
λiℓwiℓαi
) 1−ρ
ρ
= λ′ij − qj
(
αi
∑
ℓ∈M
λiℓwiℓ
) 1−ρ
ρ
= λ′ij − qj(αiαρ−1i )
1−ρ
ρ
= α1−ρi λij − qjα1−ρi
= α1−ρi
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂xij
We have
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all i, j by stationarity (and the inequality holds with equality when xij > 0),
so
∂L′i(xi,αi,λ
′
i)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all j ∈M (and the inequality holds with equality when xij > 0). Thus for each i ∈ N ,
(xi, αi, λ
′
i) satisfies stationarity for Program 8 for xij for all j ∈M .
36Note that this is not defining λ′ij to be a function of αi. This is defining λ
′
ij based on a fixed value of αi: in particular, the
value from (x,α,q,λ), which we assumed to be optimal for Program 7. Consequently, the derivatives in the KKT conditions
treat λ′ij as a constant.
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As mentioned above, we have wijαi = xij whenever λij > 0. Since λ
′
ij > 0 if and only if λij > 0, we
have wijαi = xij whenever λ
′
ij > 0. Thus for each i ∈ N , (xi, αi, λ′i) satisfies complementary slackness for
Program 8. Therefore (xi, αi, λ
′
i) satisfies the KKT conditions, and thus is optimal for Program 8. Therefore
xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N . The complementary slackness condition for q is identical to the market clearing
condition, so we conclude that (x, p) is a WE.
Part 2: (⇐= ) Suppose that (x, p) is a WE, where p(xi) = ρ(
∑
j∈M qjxij)
1/ρ for constants q1, . . . , qm ∈
R≥0. Then xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ N , so there exists α,λ′ such that (xi, αi, λ′i) is optimal for Program 8 for
all i ∈ N .
Thus by stationarity, we have
∂L′i(xi,αi,λ
′
i)
∂αi
≤ 0 and ∂L′i(xi,αi,λ′i)∂xij ≤ 0 for all i, j (and if αi > 0 and xij > 0,
the inequalities hold with equality). Using the definition of p, we have
∂L′i(xi,αi,λ
′
i)
∂xij
= λ′ij − qj
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ
.
Thus 1 ≤∑j∈M λ′ijwij and λ′ij ≤ qj(p(xi)/ρ)1−ρ.
We first claim that αi > 0 for all i ∈ N . For each agent i, there must exist j ∈ M such that λ′ij > 0
and wij > 0: otherwise 1 ≤
∑
j∈M λ
′
ijwij would be impossible. Consider any such j: then 0 < λ
′
ij ≤
qj
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ
, so we must have p(xi) > 0. Suppose αi = 0: then the optimal objective value of Program 8
is αi− p(xi) < 0. But setting xij = 0 for all j ∈M achieves an objective value of 0, so αi− p(xi) < 0 cannot
be optimal. This is a contradiction, and so αi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Returning to the stationarity conditions, we then have 1 =
∑
j∈M λ
′
ijwij . Complementary slackness
implies that wijαi = xij whenever λ
′
ij > 0, so we get
αi =
∑
j∈M
λ′ijwijαi
αi =
∑
j:λ′ij>0
λ′ijwijαi
αi =
∑
j∈M
λ′ijxij
Combining this with λ′ij = qj
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ
whenever xij > 0 gives us
αi =
∑
j:xij>0
λ′ijxij
=
∑
j∈M
qjxij
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ
=
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ ∑
j∈M
qjxij
=
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ(
p(xi)/ρ
)ρ
= p(xi)/ρ
Now let λij = α
ρ−1
i λ
′
ij for all i, j. We claim that (x,α,q,λ) satisfies the KKT conditions for Program 7.
For each (i, j) pair, we have
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂αi
= αρ−1i −
∑
j∈M
λijwij = α
ρ−1
i
(
1−
∑
j∈M
λ′ijwij
)
= αρ−1i
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂αi
Since αi > 0, stationarity for Program 8 implies that
∂L′i(xi,αi,λ
′
i)
∂αi
= 0, so we have ∂L(x,α,q,λ)∂αi = 0. Next, we
have
∂L(x,α,q,λ)
∂xij
= λij − qj
= αρ−1i λ
′
ij − qj
= αρ−1i (λ
′
ij − qjα1−ρi )
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= αρ−1i
(
λ′ij − qj
(
p(xi)/ρ
)1−ρ)
= αρ−1i
∂L′i(xi, αi, λ
′
i)
∂xij
Stationarity for Program 8 implies that
∂L′i(xi,αi,λ
′
i)
∂xij
≤ 0 for all i, j (and when xij > 0, this holds with
equality), so we have ∂L(x,α,q,λ)∂xij for all i, j (and when xij > 0, this holds with equality). Thus we have
shown that (x,α,q,λ) satisfies stationarity for Program 7. As before, the market clearing condition is
equivalent to complementary slackness for q. By complementary slackness for λ′ (for Program 8), we have
wijαi = xij whenever λ
′
ij > 0. By definition, λ
′
ij > 0 if and only if λij > 0, so this implies the required
complementary slackness for λ (for Program 7). Therefore (x,α,q,λ) satisfies the KKT conditions for
Program 7, and thus is optimal for that program. We conclude that x ∈ Ψ(ρ).
C The First Welfare Theorem and linear pricing
Recall our main result:
Theorem 4.1. Assume each vi is homogeneous of degree r, concave, and differentiable. For any ρ ∈ (0, 1]
and any allocation x, we have x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if there exist q1, . . . , qm ∈ R≥0 such that for the pricing
rule
p(xi) = ρr
ρ−1
ρ
( ∑
j∈M
qjxij
)1/ρ
,
(x, p) is a WE. Furthermore, q1, . . . , qm are optimal Lagrange multipliers for Program 1.
For this class of valuations, Theorem 4.1 for ρ = 1 implies the First Welfare Theorem: p becomes a linear
pricing rule, and CES welfare for ρ = 1 is just utilitarian welfare. In particular, Theorem 4.1 implies both
the existence of a WE, and that every WE maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Typically, the “the First Welfare Theorem” refers to just half of this: that every WE maximizes utilitarian
welfare. The reason is that WE are not always guaranteed to exist: for divisible goods, generally at least
concavity or quasi-concavity of valuations is necessary. On the other hand, very few assumptions are needed
to show that linear pricing equilibria always maximize utilitarian welfare; for example, divisibility of goods
is not needed. We provide a proof of this below.
Theorem C.1 (The First Welfare Theorem). Let Xi ⊂ Rm denote the set of feasible bundles for agent i (not
necessarily convex, and not necessarily the same for all agents). Let Di(p) = argmaxxi∈Xi(vi(xi) − p(xi))
and assume p is linear. Then if (x, p) is a WE, x maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Proof. Since p is linear, there exist q1, . . . , qm such that p(yi) =
∑
j∈M qjyij for any bundle yi. Consider an
arbitrary feasible allocation y. Since (x, p) is a WE, we have xi ∈ Di(p), so vi(xi)− p(xi) ≥ vi(yi)− p(yi).
Therefore
vi(xi)−
∑
j∈M
qjxij ≥ vi(yi)−
∑
j∈M
qjyij
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
qjxij ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(yi)−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
qjxij
∑
i∈N
vi(xi)−
∑
j∈M
qj
∑
i∈N
xij ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(yi)−
∑
j∈M
qj
∑
i∈N
xij
Furthermore,
∑
i∈N xij = 1 for all j ∈ M with qj > 0. Also, since y is a valid allocation,
∑
i∈N yij ≤ 1 for
all j ∈M . Therefore ∑
i∈N
vi(xi)−
∑
j∈M
qj
∑
i∈N
xij ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(yi)−
∑
j∈M
qj
∑
i∈N
xij
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∑
i∈N
vi(xi)−
∑
j∈M
qj ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(yi)−
∑
j∈M
qj
∑
i∈N
vi(xi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(yi)
Thus the utilitarian welfare of x is at least as high as that of any other allocation. We conclude that x
maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Note that no assumptions at all were made on the nature of the valuations: all we needed was xi ∈
argmaxyi∈Xi(vi(yi) − p(yi)), and
∑
j∈M xij = 1 whenever qj > 0. The most natural cases are Xi = Rm≥0
(divisible goods) and Xi = {0, 1}m (indivisible goods), but the result does hold more broadly.
D Omitted proofs
Theorem 4.2 (Euler’s Theorem for homogeneous functions). Let f : Rm≥0 → R be differentiable and ho-
mogenous of degree r. Then for any b = (b1, . . . bm) ∈ Rm≥0,
∑m
j=1 bj
∂f(b)
∂bj
= rf(b).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary b ∈ Rm≥0 and let g(λ) = f(λb). Since f is differentiable, so is g, and its derivative is
given by the multidimensional chain rule: dg(λ)dλ =
∑m
j=1 bj
∂f(λb)
∂bj
. Since f is homogeneous of degree r, we
have f(λb) = λrf(b) for all λ ≥ 0. Thus g(λ) = λrf(b) for all λ ≥ 0, so we can differentiable both sides of
this equation to get
∑m
j=1 bj
∂f(λb)
∂bj
= rλr−1f(b). This holds for all λ ≥ 0, so setting λ = 1 completes the
proof.
Lemma 6.1. Let f : R≥0 → R≥0 be differentiable and homogeneous of degree r. Then there exists c ∈ R≥0
such that f(x) = cxr.
Proof. By Euler’s Theorem (Theorem 4.2), we have x
df(x)
dx
= rf(x) for all x ∈ R≥0. Let y = f(x). We can
solve this differential equation explicitly:
1
y
· dy
dx
=
r
x∫
1
y
· dy
dx
dx =
∫
r
x
dx∫
1
y
dy = r
∫
1
x
dx
ln y = r lnx+ ln c
where c (and thus ln c) is some constant. Therefore
ey = er ln x+ln c
y = cxr
Thus f(x) = cxr, as required.
Lemma 6.2. Let m = 1 and vi(xi) = wix
r
i for all i ∈ N where r ∈ (0, 1]. Then ρ ∈ (0, 1] and rρ 6= 1,
x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if
xi =
wi
ρ
1−rρ∑
k∈N wk
ρ
1−rρ
If x ∈ Ψ(ρ) and r = ρ = 1, then whenever xi > 0, wi = maxk∈N wk.
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Proof. As in Section 4, strong duality for Program 1 implies that any optimal x must satisfy the KKT condi-
tions. Thus x ∈ Ψ(ρ) if and only if there exists q ∈ R≥0 such that (1) stationarity holds: ∂vi(xi)
∂xi
vi(xi)
ρ−1 ≤ q
for all i ∈ N , and if xi > 0, the inequality holds with equality, and (2) complementary slackness holds: either∑
i∈N xi = 1, or q = 0.
Since we assume that wi > 0 for all i ∈ N , any allocation with
∑
i∈N xi < 1 is not Pareto optimal, and
thus cannot be optimal for Program 1. In other words, we must have q > 0. Thus complementary slackness
simply requires that
∑
i∈N xi = 1, and we can focus on stationarity.
We first handle ρ = 1. In this case,
∂vi(xi)
∂xi
vi(xi)
ρ−1 =
∂vi(xi)
∂xi
= wi. Thus if x ∈ Ψ(ρ) we must have
wi ≤ q, and if xi > 0, then wi = q. This implies that q = maxk∈N wk. Thus if xi > 0, then wi = maxk∈N wk,
as required.
For the rest of the proof, we assume rρ 6= 1. Since r, ρ ∈ (0, 1], we have 0 < rρ < 1. By the definition of
vi, for an arbitrary allocation x and i ∈ N we have
∂vi(xi)
∂xi
vi(xi)
ρ−1 = (wirx
r−1
i )(w
ρ−1
i x
r(ρ−1)
i ) = rw
ρ
i x
rρ−1
i
Thus q ≥ rwρi xrρ−1i . Since rρ < 1, if xi = 0, then xrρ−1i is undefined. Therefore stationarity is satisfied if
and only if q = rwρi x
rρ−1
i for all i ∈ N , which is equivalent to
xi = (q/r)
1
rρ−1w
ρ
1−rρ
i (9)
Furthermore, if x satisfies Equation 9 for all i ∈ N , then ∑i∈N xi = 1 is equivalent to∑
i∈N
(q/r)
1
rρ−1w
ρ
1−rρ
i = 1
(q/r)
1
rρ−1 =
(∑
i∈N
wi
ρ
1−rρ
)−1
Therefore x satisfies stationarity and complementary slackness (and thus satisfies x ∈ Ψ(ρ)) if and only if
xi =
wi
ρ
1−rρ∑
k∈N wk
ρ
1−rρ
as required.
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